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WRESTLING WITH EQUITY: IDENTIFIABLE
TRENDS AS THE FEDERAL COURTS GRAPPLE
WITH THE PRACTICAL SIGNIFICANCE OF
MARTINEZ V. RYAN& TREVINO V THALER
Allen L. Bohnert*
I.

INTRODUCTION

For decades, the Supreme Court of the United States was clear that
the quality of legal assistance a prisoner received during his or her state
collateral-review proceedings was of no significance in federal habeas
proceedings, even if effective assistance from counsel at trial and on
direct appeal was constitutionally guaranteed.'

If state direct appeal

counsel failed to properly raise a compelling constitutional claim in
direct appeal proceedings? Well, that claim was procedurally defaulted

in federal habeas and barred from merits consideration absent an
acceptable excuse or a showing that failing to review the claim would

result in an innocent person being punished.' But, if appellate counsel's
ineffective assistance was sufficiently alleged in state court, then that
appellate-ineffectiveness

could

be

used

as

a

sufficient

excuse,

overcoming the default of the underlying claim and allowing the federal
3
habeas court to review the underlying claim's constitutional merits.

* Assistant Federal Public Defender, Office of the Federal Public Defender for the Southern
District of Ohio, Capital Habeas Unit, Columbus, Ohio. I thank my wife and children for their
loving and unconditional support; my public defender brothers and sisters across the country, who
strive daily to fulfill the promise of Gideon v. Wainwright; and my colleagues and friends in the
habeas community, especially the Island of Misfit Toys that is the CHU family. I also thank Andrew
T. Katbi for the inspiration and legacy of relentless optimism. I miss you, my brother. I will see you
again, but not yet. Not yet.
1. Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478,488-89 (1986).
2. Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 749-50 (1991) (holding that Wainwright and its
progeny apply in all cases in which a state prisoner has defaulted his federal claims in state court
pursuant to an independent and adequate state procedural rule); Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72,
88, 90-91 (1977) (applying procedural default rule in context of counsel's failure to make
contemporaneous objections).
3. See Murray,477 U.S. at 488-89.
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What if, on the other hand, state collateral-review ("collateralreview" or "post-conviction" or "IRCP") counsel failed to properly raise
a compelling constitutional claim in state collateral proceedings? 4 Too
bad-the claim was procedurally defaulted in federal habeas, barred
from merits
consideration,
and
collateral-review
counsel's
ineffectiveness was irrelevant to overcoming the default.5 Ineffective
assistance of counsel ("IAC") in a state collateral-review proceeding
could not suffice to overcome a procedural default, the Supreme Court
held in Coleman v. Thompson,6 because there is no constitutional right to
an attorney in state collateral-review proceedings, and thus, no
Sixth Amendment7 right to a constitutionally effective attorney in
such proceedings.
Such was the state of habeas corpus law for more than twenty
years, including after Congress passed the Antiterrorism and Effective
Death Penalty Act of 1996 ("AEDPA"), 8 which was intended to severely
restrict the power of the federal courts to review constitutional claims
arising from state-court criminal proceedings. 9 AEDPA, especially as
construed by the Roberts Court, tells criminal defendants that they have
one bite at the apple to bring their federal constitutional claims into
court-and that this bite should occur in state court.1 ° State-court
counsel's failure to develop and present to the state courts a prisoner's
constitutional claims and the evidence in support of those claims will
significantly hinder the prisoner's ability to receive a full merits review
of his claims and evidence by the federal habeas courts.
In that post-AEDPA world, the legal irrelevance of state collateralreview counsel's effectiveness-or lack thereof-created a gaping
inequity that cried out for the Court's intervention. 1 A state criminal
defendant whose constitutional rights were violated at trial might have a
4. Different states have different terms for proceedings that fall within the definition of
"collateral-review," meaning legal proceedings that attack a prisoner's conviction and/or sentence in
a proceeding other than direct appeal. See Wall v. Kholi, 562 U.S. 545, 547 (2011). These statespecific terms are functional equivalents. For simplicity's sake, this article will employ the terms
"collateral review," "post-conviction," and "IRCP" interchangeably.
5. Coleman, 501 U.S. at 752-53.
6. 501 U.S. 722 (1991).
7. Id.at 752-53.
8. Pub. L. No. 104-132, 110 Stat. 1214 (codified at 28 U.S.C. §§ 2241-2255).
9. See Emily Garcia Uhrig, The Sacrifice of Unarmed Prisonersto Gladiators: The PostAEDPA Access-to-the-Courts Demandfor a Constitutional Right to Counsel in Federal Habeas
Corpus, 14 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 1219, 1227-28(2012).

10. See Eric M. Freedman, Enforcing the ABA Guidelines in Capital State Post-Conviction
ProceedingsAfter Martinez and Pinholster, 41 HOFSTRA L. REV. 591, 597-98 (2013); Uhrig, supra

note 9, at 1228.
11. See Uhrig, surpanote 9, at 1228.
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remedy in federal habeas, even if the claim was defaulted in federal
court, so long as the constitutional claim should have been raised on
direct appeal and direct-appeal counsel was ineffective for failing to
raise the claim; but, the same defendant would have no remedy
at all if an equally compelling constitutional claim was defaulted
because it should have been raised-but was not-in a state collateralreview proceeding. 12
Against that backdrop, the Court has wrestled with the significance
of state collateral-review counsel's ineffective assistance: first in
Martinez v. Ryan, 13 and then again during the next term in Trevino v.
Thaler.14 The Court granted certiorari in Martinez to address whether a
state prisoner has a constitutional right to effective assistance of postconviction counsel.15 But, the Court avoided that constitutional question
in Martinez, and again in Trevino.' 6 Instead, the Court used its
supervisory power to create a new equitable rule carving out an
exception to Coleman.1 7 Under Martinez and Trevino, a procedural
default can be excused when: (1) the underlying, defaulted claim is
"substantial," which means it has "some merit" or would otherwise
satisfy the Certificate of Appealability ("COA") standard established in
Miller-El v. Cockrell;'8 (2) there was inadequate counsel-absence of
court-appointed counsel or IAC-during the initial-review collateral
proceeding; (3) "the state collateral-review proceeding was the 'initial'
review proceeding as to the underlying, defaulted claim;" and (4) state
law, as a matter of its structure, design, and operation, does not allow
most defendants a meaningful opportunity to develop and present an
IAC claim, or to receive a meaningful review of the merits of that IAC
claim, on direct appeal.' 9
But now what? In the immediate wake of Martinez and Trevino, the
most significant or common matters that arose were primarily
procedural. For instance, does the equitable exception apply in a
particular jurisdiction as a matter of law? Does it apply in a particular
case? Was Martinez or Trevino, or both, solo or in conjunction with
12. See id. at 1238.
13. 132 S. Ct. 1309 (2012).
14. 133 S. Ct. 1911 (2013).
15. Martinez, 132 S. Ct. at 1313, 1315.
16. Trevino, 133 S. Ct. at 1921; Martinez, 132 S. Ct. at 1315, 1321.
17. Trevino, 133 S. Ct. at 1921; Martinez, 132 S. Ct. at1315.
18. 537 U.S. 322 (2003).
19. Trevino, 133 S. Ct. at 1918; Miller-El, 537 U.S. at 335-36; see Martinez, 132 S. Ct. at
1318-19; see also Dickens v. Ryan, 740 F.3d 1302, 1319 (9th Cir. 2014) (en banc) (articulating the
Supreme Court's holding from Trevino in a four-prong test).

Published by Scholarly Commons at Hofstra Law, 2015

3

Hofstra Law Review, Vol. 43, Iss. 4 [2015], Art. 1

HOFSTRA LA WREVIEW

[Vol. 43:945

other case-specific factors, a valid basis for reopening a final judgment
or for reconsideration of a recent decision? Was Martinez a significant
change in the law? Was Trevino? Must Martinez!Trevino arguments be
exhausted in state court? Should "Rhines stays, 20 issue to allow
exhaustion of newly viable claims? Do the principles articulated in
Martinez and Trevino apply to allow federal review of claims that are
procedurally barred from merits review not because they are defaulted,
but rather because they were untimely filed?
But, as Martinez and Trevino move from infancy to relative
adolescence, the more typical focus of deliberation has evolved, as well,
moving from the procedural realm to substantive considerations. Stated
in the most general, basic terms, Martinez and Trevino, read together,
establish that a federal habeas petitioner may be able to overcome a
procedural default and, thereby, obtain a merits adjudication of a
constitutional claim in certain situations when the effectiveness--or
absence-of state post-conviction counsel is implicated. Beyond that
baseline notion, however, identifying the functional requirements
established by Martinez and Trevino has been an exercise in headacheinducing analysis that would make Lewis Carroll, Franz Kafka, or
Joseph Heller proud, as the lower courts wrestle with what exactly those
cases say-and do not say-and what they mean.
This Article is an effort to identify particular trends in how the
federal courts are substantively applying Martinez and Trevino,2' and to
help provide some analytical guidance to counsel representing habeas
petitioners wrestling with thorny Martinez/Trevino-relatedmatters. In
each Part to follow, this Article will identify a particular trending issue
arising from Martinez and Trevino, and offer some explanation of how
the lower federal courts are grappling with that issue.23 Then, at the
answer the inevitable
conclusion of each Part, I will endeavor to
24
question from habeas lawyers: "so now what?"
Part II addresses what must be demonstrated to excuse a procedural
default under Martinez and Trevino.25 Part III contains a discussion of
what "substantial" means in the MartinezITrevino context, including

20. Rhines v. Weber, 544 U.S. 269, 291-94 (2005).
21. See infra Part I.A.
22. See infra Parts I-V. Capital cases are my primary focus here; non-capital cases present
some of the same issues, but any substantive differences between capital and non-capital cases
involving Martinez and Trevino are beyond the scope of this Article.
23. See infra Parts 1-V.
24. See infra Parts II.B, IlB, IV.B, V.B.
25. See infra Part 11.
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how and why it matters.26 Part IV analyzes matters related to assessing
post-conviction counsel's performance as part of the Martinez/Trevino
inquiry. 27 This includes consideration of which standards should be the
appropriate measuring stick against which to assess post-conviction
counsel's performance, as well as a discussion about the sources for
identifying the appropriate professional norms. 28 And finally, Part V
entails discussion about how to establish inadequate post-conviction
counsel after counsel's deficient performance has been determined. 9
II.

WHAT MUST BE DEMONSTRATED TO EXCUSE A PROCEDURAL
DEFAULT UNDER MARTINEZ AND TREVINO?

In Martinez, the Court explained that the rules for when a prisoner
can "excuse a procedural default are elaborated in the exercise of the
Court's discretion."3 ° The Court then proceeded to announce the crux of
its decision: when a prisoner must raise a trial-IAC claim in a collateral
proceeding, the "prisoner may establish cause for a default of an
ineffective-assistance claim in two circumstances," which collectively
can be characterized as "inadequate counsel" in post-conviction. 31 Then
the Court continued: "To overcome the default, a prisoner must also
demonstrate that the underlying ineffective-assistance-of-trial-counsel
("IATC") claim is a substantial one, which is to32 say that the prisoner
must demonstrate that the claim has some merit.,
Then, in Trevino, the Court specifically enumerated a
four-part analysis that, if satisfied, would thereby excuse a defendant's
procedural default:
(1) the claim of "[IATC]" was a "substantial" claim; (2) the "cause"
consisted of there being "no counsel" or only "ineffective" counsel
during the state collateral review proceeding; (3) the state collateral
review proceeding was the "initial" review proceeding in respect to the
"[IATC] claim;" and (4) state law requires that an "[IATC
be raised in an initial-review collateral proceeding."
claim] ...

26. See infra Part Il.
27. See infra Part IV.
28. See infra Part IV.
29. See infra Part V.
30. Martinez v. Ryan, 132 S. Ct. 1309, 1318 (2012) (citing McCleskey v. Zant, 499 U.S. 467,
490 (1991)).
31. Id. (emphasis added).
32. Martinez, 132 S. Ct. at 1318-19 (emphasis added) (comparing Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537
U. S. 322 (2003), which describes the standards for COAs to issue).
33. Trevino v. Thaler, 133 S. Ct. 1911, 1918 (quoting Martinez, 132 S. Ct. at 1318-21). The
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What does this mean, however? What is the result if a petitioner
can establish each of the four Martinez/Trevino elements? Do any of the
four elements have any analytical significance directly or by analogy
(that is, do any of the factors, alone or in combination with others,
necessarily equate to "cause" or "prejudice" under Coleman)? Does (and
should) the traditional "cause and prejudice" inquiry even play a
significant role in the Martinez!Trevinocontext?
A.

What the Federal CourtsHave Done

Thus far, the federal courts appear to be vexed by what standard to
use for assessing Martinez!Trevino arguments. Courts in the Third, Fifth,
Sixth, Eighth, Ninth, and Eleventh Circuits have wrestled with variations
of the question of what must be done to overcome a default via
Martinez!Trevino, and the results are inconsistent.34
1. The Majority Approach: Conflation of "Cause and Actual
Prejudice" Assessments, or Modification of "Cause and
Prejudice" in the Martinez/Trevino Context
Most of the courts have at least used language that suggests
recognition that the ordinary Coleman "cause and actual prejudice"
standard for overcoming a procedural default is not the applicable
paradigm in the Martinez/Trevino context (that is, in the scenario in
which the petitioner has defaulted-but-substantial claims due to
inadequate IRCP counsel).35 Some courts have expressly stated that the
traditional Coleman "cause and actual prejudice" standard is
inapplicable in the Martinez/Trevino context.3 6 Satisfy the four
Martinez/Trevino elements, these courts have reasoned, and the
petitioner has excused the default. 37 Other courts have tried to shoehorn
the "cause and prejudice" language into the Martinez/Trevino context by
trying to label which of the four elements individually or collectively
constitute "cause" and "prejudice." 38 This second approach, more than
being meaningful substantively, may simply reflect federal jurists'

Court in Trevino then modified the fourth element to include jurisdictions where "state procedural
framework, by reason of its design and operation, makes it highly unlikely in a typical case that a
defendant will have a meaningful opportunity to raise a claim of ineffective assistance of trial
counsel on direct appeal." Id.
at 1921.
34. See infra Part I1.A.1.
35. See, e.g., Glenn v. Wynder, 743 F.3d 402, 409-11 (3d Cir. 2013).
36. See, e.g., Claboume v. Ryan, 745 F.3d 362, 374-78 (9th Cir. 2014).
37. See, e.g., id.
38. Tabler v. Stephens, 588 F. App'x 297, 305-06 (5th Cir. 2014).
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hesitancy to depart from the well-worn and familiar labels used in
habeas jurisprudence. 39 But whether they have done so explicitly or
implicitly, courts in the Third, Fifth, Sixth, Ninth and Eleventh Circuits
have articulated and/or applied an approach that melds the traditional
"cause" inquiry and the traditional "actual prejudice" inquiry in the
MartinezITrevino context. 40 Regardless of the labels attributed
to any particular showing, a prisoner can overcome a procedural
default-thereby obtaining meaningful federal merits review of
the otherwise defaulted claim-by satisfying each of the four
Martinez!Trevino elements. 4 1
This interpretation finds support in the text of both Martinez and
Trevino. First, in Martinez, the Court seemingly blurred any distinction
between "cause" and "prejudice" showings in the Martinez context:
Where, under state law, claims of [IATC] must be raised in an
initial-review collateral proceeding, a proceduraldefault will not bar a

federal habeas court from hearing a substantial claim of ineffective
there
assistance at trial if in the initial-review collateralproceeding,
42
was no counsel or counsel in thatproceeding was ineffective.

In other words, the Court first announced the circumstances in which its
newly announced equitable rule would apply-where claims must be
raised in an IRCP, rather than on direct appeal-and then explained what
a prisoner must show to overcome the ordinary bar on federal merits
review of a procedurally defaulted claim-that the defaulted claim is
substantial and the default was due to inadequate counsel during the
39. Under this method, "cause" is often equated to showing inadequate IRCP counsel at the
first opportunity to raise a constitutional claim-Martinez/Trevino elements (2) through (4), see
Henness v. Bagley, 766 F.3d 550, 556-57 (6th Cir. 2014), and "prejudice" is shown by
demonstrating the remaining first element of Martinez/Trevino-that is, by demonstrating the
prisoner's defaulted claim is "substantial." See Glenn, 743 F.3d at 410-11.
Or, put differently, the substantiality inquiry in Martinez/Trevino element (1) has been
used by some courts as a shorthand way to reference "actual prejudice" caused by inadequate IRCP
counsel. If the defaulted claim is substantial, the reasoning goes, then the absence of any meaningful
investigative opportunity, and any meaningful merits review of that substantial claim, subverts
protection of"a bedrock principle in our justice system." Trevino v. Thaler, 133 S. Ct. 1911, 1917
(2013). And, when the right to effective counsel that lies at "the foundation of our adversary
system," has been subverted, confidence in the verdict is undermined, thereby establishing the
fundamental definition of Strickland prejudice. See id.
If, on the other hand, the claim is insubstantial, there is no harm done to the prisonerthus no "prejudice"-if the federal court does not review the substantive merits of the defaulted
claim. Confidence in the verdict is not undermined because the defaulted claim is without any merit.
In that situation, the federal habeas court would have no equitable reason to excuse the default.
40. Tabler, 588 F. App'x at 305-07.
41. Trevino, 133 S. Ct. at 1918.
42. Martinez v. Ryan, 132 S. Ct. 1309, 1320 (2012) (emphases added).
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IRCP.43 Questions of which MartinezITrevino element or elements
constitute "cause," and which elements constitute "prejudice" are
analytically unimportant, since the Court explicitly set out what a
petitioner must do to overcome the default, eschewing any "cause" or
"prejudice" labels in the process.44
This conflation of "cause" and "prejudice" in the Martinez context
finds further support in Trevino's language that characterized the
Martinez holding as "allowing a federal habeas court to find 'cause,'
thereby excusing a defendant's proceduraldefault," if each of the four
MartinezITrevino elements are satisfied.45 The Court's ultimate
disposition of Trevino also supports the majority conflation approach. In
Trevino, the lower courts had simply rejected the prisoner's Martinez
arguments because Martinez's equitable exception allegedly did not
apply to Texas prisoners.46 Thus, the lower courts had not assessed
whether Trevino could demonstrate everything necessary to excuse the
default.47 After the Supreme Court held that the Martinez equitable
exception does indeed apply in states like Texas, the Court expressly
refrained from deciding which court-state or federal-should be given
the first crack at adjudicating the merits of Trevino's defaulted IAC
claim.48 More significantly, the Court also explicitly refrained from
deciding whether Trevino's trial-IAC claim was "substantial" or whether
Trevino's IRCP counsel "was ineffective. 4 9 Or, stated differently, the
Court expressly identified, but refrained from deciding, the factors
necessary for Trevino to overcome the default via Martinez. Notably,
there is no mention of an additional "prejudice" inquiry. The majority of
federal courts have followed suit.5"
a. Ninth Circuit
The Ninth Circuit has expressly spoken to this issue. In Ha Van
Nguyen v. Curry, the court distinguished between what was necessary to
overcome a procedural default in a Martinez context and what was
necessary to show in an "ordinary" case in which a state procedural
default may be excused only if the petitioner can demonstrate cause and
43.
44.
45.
46.
47.
48.
49.
50.

Id.
See id.
Trevino, 133 S.Ct. at 1918 (emphasis added).
Id.at1916.
Id.at1916-17.
Id.at1921.
Id.
See infra Part B.A.l.a-f.
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"actual prejudice" in accordance with Coleman.51 The court explained
that, in the Martinez context, showing cause and prejudice was subject to
a "relaxed" standard.52 The court then reasoned that the Supreme Court
in Martinez created a four-part test for excusing a procedural default by
virtue of inadequate IRCP counsel, and that in such a situation the
53
procedural default "may be excused if there is 'cause' for the default.,
The Nguyen court explained that "'[c]ause' under Martinez has a
different meaning than under Coleman.,5 4 "Cause" is established, the
court explained, when the four Martinez elements, as articulated and
modified by Trevino, are met.55
In Detrich v. Ryan, which preceded Nguyen, the four-judge
plurality explained the four elements enumerated in Trevino "are the
only four requirements to overcome a procedural default under
Martinez. 5 6 According to the plurality, "[u]nder the new Martinez rule,
a procedural default by state [post-conviction relief ("PCR")] counsel in
failing to raise trial-counsel IAC is excused if there is 'cause' for the
default. 57 The plurality then used terminology that referenced the
ordinary "cause and prejudice" inquiry, to reason that the first Martinez
element, "that the prisoner show a 'substantial' underlying trial-counsel
IAC claim, may be seen as the Martinez equivalent of the 'prejudice'
requirement under the ordinary 'cause' and 'prejudice' rule from
Wainwright.,58 The net result, regardless of the terminology used, was
that a default could be excused if the four MartinezITrevino elements
were satisfied. 59
In Detrich, the five-judge dissent agreed with that assessment,
although in different terminology which more explicitly invoked the
typical "cause and prejudice" requirement, explaining that

51. 736 F.3d 1287, 1292 (9th Cir. 2013).
52. Id. ("In Martinez, the Supreme Court relaxed the Coleman cause-and-prejudice standard
for excuse from procedural default in a narrow category of cases."); see also id.(discussing the
Martinez court's explanation that the Supreme Court's answer to the question of whether a federal
habeas court may excuse a default when the claim was not properly presented in state court was that
the default of such a claim "should be excused under a more lenient standard than cause and
prejudice under Coleman").
53. Id. at 1293.
54. Id.
55. Id.
56. 740 F.3d 1237, 1245 (9th Cir. 2013) (en bane) (plurality opinion).
57. Id. at 1244.
58. Id. at 1245; see also Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72, 87-91 (1977) (discussing the
"cause" and "prejudice" rule).
59. Detrich, 740 F.3d at 1244-45 (plurality opinion).
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[u]nder Martinez, a court may excuse the procedural default of an IAC
claim in cases like this one if the petitioner establishes both (1) cause,
by showing [inadequate IRCP counsel] ... ; and (2) prejudice, by
showing that the underlying claim of trial counsel's
ineffectiveness is
"substantial," meaning that it has "some merit." 60
There also were five votes (and thus a majority) for the remand decision
itself, which seemed to conflate any meaningful distinction between
purported "cause" and "prejudice" elements in the Martinez/Trevino
context. 61 Remand was
to the district court under Martinez to determine, in the first instance,
whether there is "cause" to excuse state PCR counsel's procedural
default. If the district court finds that there was "cause," it should then
address on the merits the substantial trial-counsel IAC claims62that it
previously held procedurally defaulted under pre-Martinez law.
Accordingly, there were ten votes in Detrich for the proposition that
regardless of the way things might be done in an ordinary procedural
default analysis, a procedural default arising in the Martinez/Trevino
context can be excused by showing inadequate counsel in the initialreview collateral proceedings as to the underlying, defaulted claim in
question, and that the underlying, defaulted claim is "substantial. 63
Then, a few months later, the en banc Ninth Circuit released its
opinion in Dickens v. Ryan.64 The eight judges in the Dickens majority
followed the approach embraced by the plurality and dissent in Detrich,
albeit with a slightly more conventional focus on the terminology.65 The
court explained that a "federal court's determination of whether a habeas
petitioner has demonstrated cause and prejudice (so as to bring his case
within Martinez's judicially created exception to the judicially created
procedural bar) is not the same as a hearing on a constitutional claim for
habeas relief."66 Thus, according to the court in Dickens:
a petitioner, claiming that PCR counsel's ineffective assistance
constituted "cause," may present evidence to demonstrate this point.

60.

Id. at 1265 (Graber, J., dissenting).

61. Id. at 1248 (plurality opinion); id. at 1262 (Graber, J., dissenting).
62. Id. at 1248 (plurality opinion); see also id. at 1262 (Watford, J., concurring in the
judgment) (agreeing that the court "should grant petitioner's motion to remand the case to the
district court, so that the district court can determine in the first instance whether petitioner's
proceduraldefault may be excused under Martinez" (emphasis added)).
63. See supra notes 60-62 and accompanying text.
64. 740 F.3d 1302 (9th Cir. 2014) (en banc).

65. See id. at 1321-22.
66.

Id. at 1321.
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The petitioner is also entitled to present evidence to demonstrate that
there is "prejudice," that is that petitioner's claim is "substantial" under
Martinez. Therefore, a district court may take evidence to the extent
necessary to determine whether the petitioner's claim67of ineffective
assistance of trial counsel is substantial under Martinez.

In essence, the court used the terms "cause" and "cause and prejudice"
as interchangeable concepts within the MartinezITrevino context, and
focused on the bottom line: if a petitioner could satisfy each of the four
Martinez!Trevinoelements, the default could be excused and a petitioner
was to receive merits review of his otherwise-defaulted underlying
claim. 68 Another Ninth Circuit panel reiterated the same approach in
Clabourne v. Ryan, while more explicitly applying the "cause" 69
and
"prejudice" labels to different parts of the Martinez/Trevino analysis.
The district court in Weber v. Sinclair provided an articulate
application of the Ninth Circuit's approach. 70 The court explained that,
under the Martinez exception to the general Coleman rule, a petitioner

can establish cause for his procedural default by showing the four
Martinez elements as modified by Trevino.7' The court eventually
concluded that demonstrating substantiality to satisfy Martinez element
(1) suffices to demonstrate Coleman "prejudice. 72 And, because the
petitioner had satisfied all four Martinez elements, the court found that

"he has demonstrated Coleman 'cause and prejudice' to overcome the
procedural default of
his IAC claim., 73 Other courts in the Ninth Circuit
74
have followed

suit.

67. Id.
68. Id.
at 1319-21.
69. 745 F.3d 362, 376-78 (9th Cir. 2014). As the Clabournepanel explained:
To demonstrate cause and prejudice sufficient to excuse the procedural default,
therefore, Martinez and Detrich require that Claboume make two showings. First, to
establish "cause," he must establish that his counsel in the state post[-]conviction
proceeding was [inadequate] ....
Second, to establish "prejudice," he must establish that
his "underlying [IATC] claim is a substantial one, which is to say that the prisoner must
demonstrate that the claim has some merit."
Id. at 377 (citing Martinez v. Ryan, 132 S.Ct. 1309, 1318 (2012)). As explained in Part V below,
Clabourne's assessment of what must be shown to establish inadequate assistance of IRCP counsel
in the form of IAC of IRCP counsel is incorrect. See infra -Part V.A. 1. But its articulation of the
requirements necessary, in the main, to overcome a procedural default via Martinez/Trevino
comports with Martinez and Trevino.
70. No. C08-1676RSL, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS, at *16-29 (W.D. Wash. Apr. 28, 2014).
71. Id.at *16-29.
72. Id.at *16-25.
73. ld.at *25.
74. See, e.g., Workman v. Blades, No. 1:08-cv-00052-EJL, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 136607, at
*25-26 (D. Idaho Sept. 24, 2014) (explaining that a showing of additional Coleman actual prejudice
is not required and that "Coleman 'actual prejudice' is met by a showing of substantiality of the
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b. Eleventh Circuit
Following Trevino, the Eleventh Circuit appears to follow the
conflation or modification approach. Most recently, in Hamm v.
Commissioner, the Circuit Court explained that the Martinez/Trevino
equitable rule:
permits a prisoner to overcome default of a trial-counsel claim when
that claim can be raised for the first time only in a collateral
proceeding and 1) the state does not appoint counsel in that initialreview collateral proceeding or 2) appointed counsel in the initialreview proceeding was ineffective under the standards of Strickland.
Additionally, a petitioner must "demonstrate that 75the underlying
[IATC] claim is a substantial one," with "some merit.
Hamm's articulation of the modification or conflation approach is

consistent with circuit precedent.76 District courts in the Eleventh Circuit
merits of the underlying IAC claim (Prong 1 of the 'cause' test)"); Cavanaugh v. Ellis, No. 1:13-cv00295-CWD, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 72852, at *19 (D. Idaho May 28, 2014) (suggesting, in dicta,
that the "cause and prejudice analysis set forth in Martinez" is distinct from the "traditional
Coleman cause and prejudice inquiry"); Benson v. Budge, No. 3:05-cv-0464-PMP-VPC, 2013 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 16831, at *6-22 (D. Nev. Feb. 7, 2013) (holding that "cause" was established because
the petitioner had no counsel in his post-conviction proceedings, and "prejudice" was established
because defaulted trial-IAC claims are substantial).
Also of note, the panel in Sexton v. Cozner seemed to contemplate a different standard, by
interpreting Martinez to require courts to determine: (1) IAC of IRCP counsel; (2) whether the
defaulted IAC claim is substantial; and (3) "whether there is prejudice." 679 F.3d 1150, 1157-59
(9th Cir. 2012) (citing Martinez v. Ryan, 132 S.Ct. 1309, 1321 (2012)). If so, however, the en banc
rulings in Detrich and Dickens overruled Sexton. Thus, any district courts that have subsequently
cited Sexton for support to require an explicit, additional "actual prejudice" requirement beyond
meeting the four Martinez!Trevino factors, in order to excuse a default, are relying on bad law. See,
e.g., Grate v. McFadden, 4:13-215-JFA-TER, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 39094, at *5-8 (D.S.C. Mar.
25, 2014) (citing Sexton to conclude MartinezTrevino requires three showings, beyond the third and
fourth Martinez elements, including "whether there is prejudice").
75. Hamm v. Comm'r, Ala. Dep't of Corr., No. 13-14376, 2015 U.S. App. LEXIS 13490, at
*25-26 (11 th Cir. Aug. 3, 2015) (per curiam) (citing Martinez, 132 S. Ct. at 1318) (citation omitted).
76. See Hittson v. GDCP Warden, 759 F.3d 1210, 1262 (1lth Cir. 2014) (rejecting
petitioner's claims regardless of whether the Martinez/Trevino exception applies in Georgia,
because petitioner "failed to establish either of the other two elements of the Martinez exceptionthat 'appointed counsel in the initial-review collateral proceeding, where the claim should have been
raised, was ineffective under the standards of Strickland'; or that 'the underlying ineffectiveassistance-of-trial-counsel claim is a substantial one"').
Additionally, in Lambrix v. Secretary, FloridaDepartment of Corrections, the Eleventh
Circuit observed in a footnote that "the Martinez rule's equitable principle may relieve petitioners of
the requirement of the judicially-createdprocedural default doctrine," but that Martinez did not
change the requirements for filing a § 2254 habeas petition. 756 F.3d 1246, 1261 n.30 (11th Cir.
2014). This statement, along with the court's statement in an earlier footnote that the procedural
default doctrine is a judge-made creation the rules for which can be elaborated in the Supreme
Court's discretion, can be read as the Eleventh Circuit's acknowledgment that the ordinary Coleman
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have likewise discussed what must be shown to overcome a procedural
default specifically in the MartinezTrevino context. At least one district
court noted that the traditional analysis is different in such a context,
explicitly referencing what the court deemed "the Martinez cause and
prejudice standard."77 Consistent with this view, but without bothering to
use the terms "cause" or "actual prejudice," another district court in the
Eleventh Circuit concluded that Martinez "contemplates a two[-]step
process for resolving" whether a defaulted claim will be barred from
federal merits review. According to the district court's order, a petitioner
"must [first] demonstrate that his IAC claims have 'some merit,"' and
then "[h]e must ...demonstrate that [IRCP] counsel was ineffective in
failing to raise those claims. 78
These courts have explained that "cause" is shown by
demonstrating three of the four showings ultimately enumerated in
Trevino as the four Martinez!Trevino elements-that is, by showing the
prisoner had inadequate counsel at the initial-review collateral
proceeding where he was forced to raise the claim. 79 This articulation is
a combination of MartinezITrevino element (2) (inadequate postconviction counsel); element (3) (the IRCP proceedings were the first
opportunity for the claim to be raised); and element (4) (the claim could
only have been raised in an IRCP, not on direct appeal). 80 These are
"external" factors that "impeded or obstructed in complying with the
State's established procedures" to prevent meaningful merits review of
the claim at the first opportunity. 8' And, to excuse the default when the
prisoner had inadequate counsel at the initial-review collateral
proceeding where he was forced to raise the claim-that is, "if the
'cause' is of the type described in ...Martinez ...the reviewing court
should consider whether the petitioner can demonstrate 'that the

"cause and actual prejudice" inquiry is different in the Martinez/Trevino context. Id. at 1260 n.27.
But, the issues before the court in Lambrix did not involve whether the petitioner had, in fact,
overcome a procedural default via Martinez/Trevino arguments, so any implicit statements
regarding the standard for doing so are dicta.
77. James v. Culliver, No. CV-10-S-2929-S, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 139696, at *56-58 &
n.39 (N.D. Ala. Sept. 30, 2014).
78. Order Granting Motion to Appoint Counsel at 6, Merck v. Sec'y, Dep't of Corr., 2014
WL 5473574 (M.D. Fla. Feb. 12, 2014) (No. 8:13-cv-1285-T-27MAP).

79. Ferguson v. Allen, No. 3:09-cv-0138-CLS-JEO, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 98518, at *36-38
(N.D. Ala. July 21, 2014).
80. Id. at *38; see Trevino v. Thaler, 133 S.Ct. 1911, 1918 (2013).
81. Martinez v. Ryan, 132 S. Ct. 1309, 1317-18 ("As Coleman recognized, an attorney's
errors during an appeal on direct review may provide cause to excuse a procedural default ....
").
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say that the
underlying [IATC] claim is a substantial one, which is to
82
prisoner must demonstrate that the claim has some merit.'
c. Third Circuit
Courts in the Third Circuit have followed similar analytical paths,
conflating or modifying the traditional
whether explicitly or implicitly
"cause and prejudice" inquiry. 83
d. Sixth Circuit
The picture in the Sixth Circuit is still developing. The Circuit
Court in Leberry v. Howerton seemed to follow the approach that
conflates or modifies the traditional "cause and prejudice" doctrine in
the MartinezITrevino context. 84 The court explicitly concluded that
petitioner Leberry had demonstrated sufficient cause to overcome his
procedural default. 85 The court's decision can be read to say that Leberry
demonstrated cause by satisfying Martinez elements (2) through (4),
including demonstrating that he received inadequate IRCP counsel when
his post-conviction counsel failed to raise the trial-IAC claims in state
court. 6 But, the court continued:

82. Ferguson, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 98518, at *39-40 (citing Martinez, 132 S. Ct. at 1318).
83. E.g., Valentin-Morales v. Mooney, No. 2:13-cv-3271-WY, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
134266, at *20-21 (E.D. Pa. Sept. 24, 2014) ("Valentin-Morales's procedural default will be
excused if he can show both that his [PCR] counsel was ineffective under Strickland, and that his
claim that his trial counsel was ineffective under Strickland is a substantial one."); see also In re
Commonwealth's Motion to Appoint Counsel Against or Directed to Defender Ass'n of Phila., Nos.
13-3853/13-3854/13-3855/13-4070/13-4269/13-4325, 2015 U.S. App. LEXIS 9878, at *54 n.4 (3d
Cir. June 12, 2015) (McKee, C.J., concurring) (explaining when procedural default can be excused
under the Coleman rule); Huggins v. Kerestes, No. 12-3655, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 139170, at *8-9
(E.D. Pa. Sept. 27, 2013) ("cause" established by showing IAC of post-conviction counsel; "actual
prejudice" established by showing underlying trial-LAC claim is substantial). The Third Circuit, in a
recent opinion, said that procedural default is excused under the Coleman rule when a prisoner can
demonstrate
cause for the default and actual prejudice as a result of the alleged violation of federal
law, or demonstrate that failure to consider the claims will result in a fundamental
miscarriage of justice," but that a "procedural default caused by state post-conviction
counsel's mistake may also be excused if [the] agency relationship between the lawyer
and client have been severed, . . or (in more limited circumstances) if the state postconviction counsel was unconstitutionally inadequate ....
Commonwealth's Motion to Appoint Counsel Against or Directed to Defender Ass'n of Phila., 2015
U.S. App. LEXIS 9878, at *54 n.4.
84. 583 F. App'x497, 499-500 (6th Cir. 2014).
85. Id. at 500.
86. Id.
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The second part of the procedural default analysis requires the court to
determine whether Leberry was prejudiced. Because the district court
did not determine whether prejudice exists, we remand this issue for
the court to address whether there87is "actual prejudice as a result of the
alleged violation of federal law."
The court concluded its opinion by clarifying that on remand "the
district court should consider whether the particular IATC claims
defaulted by Leberry are sufficiently substantial to overcome the
default., 88 The court's use of "substantial" here, in conjunction with its
instruction for the district court to assess "actual prejudice" on remand,
suggests that: (1) the court was equating substantiality with "actual
prejudice;" (2) the court was just applying labels to the four-part
MartineziTrevino analysis; and (3) the petitioner can overcome his
default by satisfying each of the four Martinez/Trevino elements.
More recently in Williams v. Mitchell, the circuit court expounded:
"As the Court explained in Trevino... Martinez held that procedural
default can be excused for cause where" a petitioner can satisfy each of
the four Martinez!Trevino elements.89 In Woolbright v. Crews, the Sixth
Circuit considered whether the MartinezITrevino equitable exception
applied to inmates in Kentucky. 90 First, the court confirmed the Martinez
and Trevino mandate that a petitioner must be afforded at least one
"truly meaningful opportunity to have [his] IATC claims fully and fairly
adjudicated." 91 Then, after holding that Kentucky state law does not
ensure a meaningful opportunity for a full and fair (meaningful) merits
review of trial-IAC claims on direct appeal, the court remanded the case
back to the district court for full reconsideration of the defaulted trialIAC claims.92 That reconsideration, the court, explained, "would first
address whether [the prisoner could] demonstrate (1) the absence or
ineffective assistance of his post-conviction counsel and (2) the
'substantial' nature of his underlying [trial-IAC] claims." 93 The court
found that if Woolbright could "demonstrate these two elements and
therefore establish cause to excuse his procedural default, the district
court [should] then reconsider whether Woolbright [could] establish
87. Id. (quoting Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 750 (1991)).
88. Id. at 502.
89. Nos. 03-3626/12-4269, 2015 U.S. App. LEXIS 11618, at *19-20 (6th Cir. July 7, 2015)
(quoting Trevino v. Thaler, 133 S.Ct. 1911, 1918 (2013)). The court then concluded the petitioner's
default could not be excused because he could not meet Martinez/Trevino element (3). Id. at *20-21.
90. No. 13-6115, 2015 U.S. App. LEXIS 11043, at *5-18 (6th Cir. June 29, 2015).
91. Id.at*18.
92. Id. at *22-23.
93. Id. at *23 (citing Sutton v. Carpenter, 745 F.3d 787, 795-96 (6th Cir. 2014)).

Published by Scholarly Commons at Hofstra Law, 2015

15

Hofstra Law Review, Vol. 43, Iss. 4 [2015], Art. 1

HOFSTRA LA W REVIEW

[Vol. 43:945

prejudice from the alleged [IATC] . In other words, the court found
MartinezITrevino elements (3) and (4) satisfied when it held the
equitable exception applied to the petitioner's claims, and left to the
district court the task of determining whether elements (1) and (2) could
be demonstrated following meaningful factual development. And, if so,
then the district court should afford a full merits review to the underlying
trial-JAC claim. This approach is consistent with the analysis employed
by the Leberry and Williams panels.
Some of Ohio's district courts have taken a similar approach. In
Landrum v. Anderson, the district court adopted the magistrate judge's
recommendation to reopen the case under Rule 60(b)(6) of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure, following Martinez,95 and to rule on the merits
of the defaulted claim. 96 The magistrate judge reasoned that "cause" was
established by showing inadequate IRCP counsel, while "prejudice" was
established by demonstrating substantiality.9 7 The court in Sheppard v.
Robinson recounted that the Supreme Court in Martinez "held for the
first time that inadequate assistance of counsel during initial collateral
review proceedings may establish cause and prejudice sufficient to
excuse procedural default of a claim of [IATC]. ' '98 Other Ohio federal
94. Id.
95. No. 1:96-cv-641, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 171777, at *1-2 (S.D. Ohio Dec. 4, 2012)
(adopting Landrum v. Anderson, No. 1:96 CV 641, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 118501, at *24-30 (S.D.
Ohio Aug. 22, 2012)); see also FED. R. Civ. P. 60(b)(6) ("On motion and just terms, the court may
relieve a party or its legal representative from a final judgment, order, or proceeding
for.., any.. . reason that justifies relief").
96. Landrum v. Anderson, No. 1:96-cv-641, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 72640, at *1-3 (S.D.
Ohio May 28, 2014) (adopting Landrum v. Anderson, No. 1:96-cv-641, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
138635, at *15-27 (S.D. Ohio Sept. 26, 2013)).
97. See Landrum, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 138635, at *9-15; Landrum, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
118501, at *7, *24.
98. No. 1:00-CV-493, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 5565, at *16 (S.D. Ohio Jan. 14, 2013)
(emphasis added). But, then the Sheppardcourt seemed to veer off track. The court found the
defaulted trial-IAC claim "substantial," and explained that substantiality was not the same as a
finding on the merits. Id. at *38-39. The court then rejected the petitioner's Martinez-based
argument by apparently finding that neither trial counsel nor IRCP counsel performed deficiently
enough "for Martinez to provide a basis" for the Court to reverse its previous conclusion that the
trial-IAC claim was procedurally defaulted. Id.
at *39-43.
To the extent that the court's analysis blended the various factors together, that fits with
an appropriate application of Martinez and Trevino. To the extent the court demanded something
beyond a substantiality showing on the trial-IAC claim before the default could be overcome,
however, that goes beyond what Martinez and Trevino required. The opaque nature of the Sheppard
court's order may also be explained by: (1) the relative newness of Martinez at that time; or (2) that
the case was before the court on a Rule 60(b)(6) motion to reopen rather than in an original review
posture. The court granted a COA, and that appeal remains pending at present. Sheppard v. Bagley,
No. 1:00-CV-493, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 47660, at *11 (S.D. Ohio Apr. 2, 2013).
The Sixth Circuit likewise prematurely assessed the merits of underlying, defaulted trial-
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district courts have also suggested that satisfying the four-part
Martinez!Trevinotest is the full enquiry for whether a procedural default
can be overcome, regardless of the nomenclature used.99
At least some of Tennessee's district courts have taken the same
approach. In Cone v. Colson, the court granted an evidentiary hearing: to
allow development of facts regarding IRCP counsel's performance; to
establish IAC of post-conviction counsel as cause for the default of
substantial trial-IAC claims; to present evidence in support of the
substantial trial-IAC claims; and to show "prejudice" to overcome the
default. 100 In other Tennessee district court cases, the courts recited a
different standard in boilerplate parts of the respective opinions by
purportedly requiring something beyond showing inadequate counsel
during the initial-review collateral proceedings, and that the claim must
be "substantial."'' l 1But the courts then backtracked, citing Clabourne for
the proposition that "'actual prejudice,' for purposes of the Coleman
analysis in the Martinez context, requires
a showing that 'the underlying
02
[IATC] claim is a substantial one.'
IAC claims to find the claims not substantial in Henness v. Bagley, 766 F.3d 550, 557-59 (6th Cir.
2014), and McGuire v. Warden, Chillicothe CorrectionalInstitution, 738 F.3d 741, 752-58 (6th Cir.
2013). But McGuire and Henness were both decided under a Rule 60(b)(6) basis, in which the
circuit court was assessing the relative substantiality in order to determine whether extraordinary
circumstances were present, not simply whether a default should be excused. Henness, 766 F.3d at
557; McGuire, 738 F.3d at 758-59.
99. See, e.g., Opinion & Order at 9-12, Hill v. Mitchell, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 95590 (S.D.
Ohio Mar. 4, 2014) (No. 1:98-cv-452) (granting COA on whether procedural default ruling was
correct, because "[w]hether Petitioner can satisfy the four-part test that the Supreme Court set forth
in Martinez and Trevino is deserving of consideration on appeal" (emphasis added)).
100. 925 F. Supp. 2d 927, 1021 (W.D. Tenn. 2013) (granting in part and denying in part a
renewed motion for evidentiary hearing).
101. Thome v. Hollway, No. 3:14-cv-0695, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 125191, at *63-65 (M.D.
Tenn. Sept. 8, 2014); Duncan v. Carpenter, No. 3:88-00992, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 110595, at *4649 (M.D. Tenn. Aug. 11, 2014); Gunter v. Steward, No. 2:13-cv-00010, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
80822, at *34-36 (M.D. Tenn. June 13, 2014) (citations omitted); see also James v. Taylor, No,
3:11-0735, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 116113, at *20-24 (M.D. Tenn. Aug. 18, 2014).
102. Clabourne v. Ryan, 745 F.3d 362, 377 (9th Cir. 2012); see Sutton v. Carpenter, No. 3:07CV-30-TAV-CCS, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 28312, at *5-6 (E.D. Tenn. Mar. 9, 2015); see also
Duncan v. Carpenter, No. 3:88-00992, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 28009, at *116 (M.D. Tenn. Mar. 4,
2015) (noting that "[g]uidance to district courts about how to implement the rulings in Martinez and
Trevino is sparse," and then relying on Clabourne's statement to conclude that the "the Coleman
prejudice prong in the Martinez context requires a showing that 'the underlying [IATC] claim is a
substantial one, which is to say that the claim has some merit"'). In Sutton v. Carpenter,the federal
district court stated:
Martinez permits a petitioner to establish cause to excuse a procedural default of an
ineffective assistance of trial counsel claim by showing that he received ineffective
assistance by post-conviction counsel.... This holding, however, does not dispense with
the "actual prejudice" requirement established by the Supreme Court in Coleman.... To
successfully establish cause and prejudice under Martinez and Trevino, a petitioner must
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A recent Sixth Circuit case reflects the confusion on this issue
arising out of a number of Tennessee district court cases. In Atkins v.
Holloway, issued just a few weeks after Woolbright, the court faced a
similar factual scenario: the petitioner's trial-JAC claims were
procedurally defaulted, and the district court had previously dismissed
the claims as defaulted without excuse.10 3 Like in Woolbright, the Atkins
court remanded the trial-AC claims for the district court to determine:
"(1) whether state post-conviction counsel was ineffective... ; and (2)
whether Atkins's claims of [JAC] were 'substantial' within the meaning
of Martinez.''0 4 But the court then continued: "Questions (1) and (2)
determine whether there is cause. The next question is (3) whether
Atkins can demonstrate prejudice. Finally.... (4) if the district court
concludes that Atkins establishes cause and prejudice as to any of
his
10 5
claims, the district court should evaluate such claims on the merits."
The genesis of the court's four-part enumeration is unclear, since it
does not track the four-part Martinez/Trevino test. And the court's
distinction between its step (3) and step (4) is similarly unclear, since the
court did not explain what it meant by its statement that Atkins must
show a substantial underlying claim of ineffective assistance of trial counsel.
2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 28312, at *5-6. The next sentence in Sutton demonstrates the confusion that
still remains, as the court quoted Thorne for the proposition that "a habeas petitioner must 'show
that his [PCR] counsel was ineffective under Stricklandv. Washington.' to establish that his claim
is substantial. Id. at 6. Of course, showing that an underlying, defaulted claim is substantial is a
different inquiry than showing that post-conviction counsel was ineffective. Furthermore, the court
in Sutton erroneously required a petitioner, "[a]s part of showing a substantial claim of ineffective
assistance of trial counsel," to "prove" the full merits of the defaulted claim. Id.
Note, also, that the court in Gunter similarly went off track by suggesting that the
petitioner was required to prove the full merits of the defaulted claim in order to demonstrate
substantiality and, therefore, "actual prejudice." Gunter, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 80822, at *37. The
court "assum[ed] that the claim of ineffective assistance of post-conviction counsel 'has some
merit,"' but found that "the petitioner cannot establish the actual-prejudice prong of the Coleman
standard for overcoming procedural default.... That is, he cannot establish a substantial claim that
trial counsel was ineffective .... Id. at *41.
Additionally, in James, the court's treatment of MartinezITrevinoarguments was muddled
at best. The court found the Martinez exception to Coleman was available, found the defaulted
claim substantial, and then ordered an evidentiary hearing on the substantive merits of the defaulted
trial-IAC claim. See James, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 116113, at *20-23. Following the hearing, the
court concluded:
Petitioner has shown prejudice due to his trial counsel's omission in failing to raise this
lack of notice defense. For these same reasons, the Court concludes that Petitioner has
demonstrated a substantial claim and the exceptional circumstances under Martinez to
present this [IAC] claim. This claim entitles Petitioner to habeas relief for serving an
invalid sentence ....

Id. at 35-36.
103. No. 12-6498, 2015 U.S. App. LEXIS 11730, at *7-15 (6th Cir. July 8, 2015).
104. Id. at *13-14.
105. Id.
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"demonstrate prejudice" under its step (3). In any event, to the extent
that Atkins conflicts with Woolbright's articulation of the governing
analysis in the Sixth Circuit,
Woolbright-as a published opinion that
106
predates A tkins-controls.
e. Fifth Circuit
The proper analysis is still unclear in the Fifth Circuit, since there is
arguably conflicting circuit authority. In Crutsinger v. Stephens, the
court explained that a petitioner seeking to excuse a default via Martinez
must "establish that his underlying LAC claim is 'substantial' and that
his state habeas counsel was ineffective. 1 °7 The court then rejected
relief because it found the petitioner had "not met the first of [the]
requirements for overcoming procedural default ...that is, that it has
'some merit."' 10 8 And, in Newbury v. Stephens, the Fifth Circuit recited
the same standard for overcoming procedural default via
Martinez/Trevino-that a petitioner must demonstrate that his state
IRCP counsel was ineffective and that the underlying claim is
substantial.' 0 9 The court explained that "if a petitioner makes both of the
showings required under Martinez," a federal court is allowed to
consider the merits of the otherwise-defaulted claim. 1 ° In a recent
decision, the Fifth Circuit in Tabler v. Stephens vacated in part its
previous order which had denied a COA, and remanded to the district
court for consideration of whether the petitioner "can establish cause for
the procedural default" of his trial-IAC claim based on LAC of postconviction counsel, "and, ifso, whether those claims merit relief."11' The
language of the Tabler court's remand instructions, like the court's
language in Newbury and Crutsinger, and other recent Fifth Circuit

106, The Atkins court's confusing analysis is perhaps best explained by arguments advanced by
Atkins's counsel; Atkins claimed that "by granting a COA, [the court had] already determined that
Atkins's [trial-lAC] claims are 'substantial,' and therefore, [the court] should remand with direction
for the district court to determine solely whether prejudice exists as to excuse his procedural
default." Atkins, 2015 U.S. App. LEXIS 11730, at *14-15. Counsel erred in arguing that a further
"prejudice" determination was even necessary under the approach adopted by the Sixth Circuit. If
the underlying claims were substantial (Martinez/Trevino element (1)), and the equitable exception
applied to the claim under Martinez/Trevino elements (3) and (4), then the only matter to be decided
on remand should have been whether state IRCP counsel was inadequate (Martinez/Trevino
element (2)).
107. 576 F. App'x 422, 430 (5th Cir. 2014).
108. Id.
109. 756 F.3d 850, 871-72 (5th Cir. 2014).
110. Id.at 872.
111. 591 F. App'x 281, 281 (5th Cir. 2015) (emphasis added).
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cases, reflects an approach that conflates or modifies the traditional
"cause and prejudice" inquiry for overcoming a procedural default."'
More recently, the district court in Wessinger v. Cain arguably
applied the conflation or modification approach, when it explained what
conditions "must be satisfied in order for [a] procedurally defaulted
claim to be heard by [a] federal habeas court."'" 13 The court explained
that IAC claims are "generally best suited for post-conviction
proceedings" under Louisiana law, and that "Martinez sets forth two
more conditions that must be satisfied"-inadequate state postconviction counsel, and thatthe underlying claim is substantial.114 At the
end of its analysis finding the default excused, the Wessinger court
found post-conviction counsel "was ineffective in pursuing a substantial
[trial-IAC] claim," and then labeled those findings "cause" under
Coleman. 1 5 Then, the court explained, it "next asks whether Petitioner
can demonstrate 'actual prejudice' as a result of IRC's failure to exhaust

112. See Gonzalez v. Stephens, No. 14-70006, 2015 U.S. App. LEXIS 5832, at *10 (5th Cir.
Apr. 10, 2015); Busby v. Stephens, No. 09-CV-160-O, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 29176, at *7-8 (N.D.
Tex. Mar. 10, 2015) (citing Martinez and Trevino, and quoting Preyor v. Stephens, 537 F. App'x
412, 421 (5th Cir. 2013)); see also Wilkins v. Stephens, 560 F. App'x 299, 314-15 (5th Cir. 2014)
(denying COA on defaulted claims because, "[e]ven assuming arguendo that state habeas
counsel.., was deficient for failing to bring the claims during state habeas proceedings, none of the
underlying IATC claims are 'substantial' as required by Martinez"). In Busby, the Fifth Circuit
furthered the proposition that:
Under Trevino, a petitioner who procedurally defaults a complaint of ineffective
assistance of trial counsel "must show that (1) his underlying claims of ineffective
assistance of trial counsel are substantial, meaning that he must demonstrate that the
claim[s] ha[ve] some merit, and (2) his initial state habeas counsel was ineffective in
failing to present those claims in his first state habeas application."
Busby, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 29176, at *7-8 (quoting Preyor, 537 F. App'x at 421).
Notably, the Tabler court's first opinion also articulated a conflated or modified inquiry
under which a default could be excused by showing that Tabler received inadequate assistance in
state post-conviction, and that his defaulted claim is substantial. See Tabler v. Stephens, 588 F,
App'x 297, 305-06 (5th Cir. 2014). The court in Tablerstated:
To fall within the Martinez exception and avoid procedural default of any claim of
ineffective assistance of trial counsel, Tabler must demonstrate (1) that his state habeas
counsel were ineffective in an initial-review collateral proceeding, "where the claim
should have been raised," and (2) "that the underlying [IATC] claim is a substantial one,
which is to say that the prisoner must demonstrate that the claim has some merit."
Id. at 305. The Tabler court denied the petitioner's claims for failing "to demonstrate the
performance of his state habeas counsel and state trial counsel was constitutionally deficient," and
stated further that "[e]ven if Tabler could show that his state habeas counsel were ineffective, he has
not made a 'substantial showing' of his underlying claim of ineffective assistance of trial counsel
required by Martinez." Id. at 305-06.
113. No. 04-637-JJB-SCR, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 97266, at *34 (M.D. La. July 27, 2015).
114. Id. (emphasis added).
115. Id.at*15.
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the substantial underlying claim." ' 1 6 At first blush, the court's
explanation might suggest something other than the conflation or
modification approach. But the court's subsequent analysis of "actual
prejudice" confirms that it applied that line of analysis: "With regard to
the initial[-]review proceeding, it is clear that Mr. Gisleson's
ineffectiveness in failing to conduct any mitigation investigation caused
actual prejudice to Petitioner's habeas claim of ineffective assistance of
trial counsel at the penalty phase."'1 7 It is impossible to separate this
conclusory finding from the court's previous findings that state postconviction counsel performed deficiently by failing to raise a substantial
trial-IAC claim for failure to investigate and present compelling
mitigation evidence in a capital trial.
f. Eighth Circuit
It appears that the Eighth Circuit, too, follows the majority
conflation/modification analysis. In Dansby v. Hobbs (Dansby I1), the
court declared that "the equitable exception to procedural default"
created in Martinez and Trevino applies to defaulted claims
if the petitioner "meets the criteria established in Martinez.""' 8 The
Dansby II court then channeled Trevino's language to say that "[a]
federal court is allowed to find 'cause,' thereby excusing a habeas
petitioner's procedural default in Arkansas, where" the Trevino
elements are satisfied." 9
Other cases from the Eighth Circuit and district courts within that
circuit likewise suggest, if not confirm, that the Eighth Circuit follows
the majority conflation/modification approach. In Sasser v. Hobbs
(Sasser1), the court explained that "Trevino creates a two-part question:
(1) did [a petitioner]'s state post[-]conviction counsel fail to raise [the
defaulted] claims, and (2) do these claims merit relief?' 120 The court's
second question arguably hedges into the minority/outlier approach by
seeming to require a petitioner to prove he would prevail on the merits

116. Id. (citing Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 750 (1991)).
117. Id.at*15-16.
118. 766 F.3d 809, 833-34 (8th Cir. 2014). Dansby II came before the Eighth Circuit after its
earlier opinion in Dansby v. Norris, 682 F.3d 711, 729 (8th Cir. 2012)-which held (pre-Trevino)
that Martinez did not apply in Arkansas-was vacated and remanded by the Supreme Court in
Dansby v. Hobbs (Dansby 1), 133 S.Ct. 2767, 2767 (2013), in light of Trevino.
119. Dansby II, 766 F.3d at 834 (emphasis added) (citing Trevino v. Thaler, 133 S.Ct. 1911,
1918 (2013)). The Dansby II court compressed the four elements enumerated in Trevino into three
elements, but the basic requirements remained the same. See id
120. 735 F.3d 833, 853 (8th Cir. 2013).
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12 1
of his underlying claims in order to excuse the default of those claims.
But, in Sasser v. Hobbs (Sasser II), the court further explained its
thinking in an order denying the state's motion for panel rehearing,
stating that the evidentiary hearing before the district court "will
necessarily address the underlying merits of the [defaulted] claims
because, unless post[-]conviction counsel's failure to raise a claim was
prejudicial, the claim remains procedurally barred despite Trevino.' ' 2 z
The court did not clarify precisely how and when a substantiality
inquiry plays a role in its distillation of Trevino into a "two-part"
question.12 3 But in light of the Dansby II court's articulation of the
controlling standard, the Sasser court's use of the term "prejudicial" can
be read as simply intending to reinforce the idea that the defaulted
claims must be substantial before the default can be excused. Similarly,
its instruction to "address the underlying merits" is best read as requiring
the district court to consider evidence presented at a hearing to
determine if the claims are at least substantial, not that the district court
should determine the full-blown merits of the claims. 124 If the defaulted
claims are substantial, the court suggests, then the failure to obtain any
meaningful merits review of those fundamental, bedrock claims due to
inadequate post-conviction counsel was prejudicial because the
substantial prospect of ineffective assistance of trial counsel undermined
any confidence in the
reliability of the verdict. 125 In other words-the
26

majority approach. 1

121.
122.

Seeid.
743 F.3d 1151, 1151 (8th Cir. 2014). The court, in Sasser II, explained that their decision

vacates the procedural default determination and remands for the district court to decide
the two-part Trevino question in the first instance, after giving Sasser an opportunity to
present evidence in support of his argument the four claims are no longer procedurally
barred. This hearing will necessarily address the underlying merits of the four claims
because, unless post[-]conviction counsel's failure to raise a claim was prejudicial, the

claim remains procedurally barred despite Trevino.
Id.
123. Although the court made no mention of the substantiality question, it at least implicitly
suggested that at least one of Sasser's trial-IAC claims was substantial by noting "Sasser's trial
counsel called a witness whose testimony ('Sasser, in all probability, will always be a very
dangerous man') could hardly have caused more self-inflicted damage to Sasser's mitigation case."
Sasser1, 735 F.3d at 853 n.12.
124.
125.

Sasserl, 743 F.3d at 1151.
See id.

126. In any event, the Sasser I court's statements implicating the proper standard for excusing
default under MartinezITrevinowere dicta, made only in the context of explaining its holding that
the petitioner was entitled to meaningful evidentiary development of the MartinezITrevino

-arguments on remand, and that part of such development was necessarily focused on the facts
supporting the underlying, defaulted trial-IAC claim. Id.

http://scholarlycommons.law.hofstra.edu/hlr/vol43/iss4/1

22

Bohnert: Wrestling With Equality: Identifiable Trends as the Federal Cour

2015]

WRESTLING WITH EQUITY

District courts in the Eighth Circuit, before and after Dansby II
and/or Sasser I and Sasser II, have used the same approach. For
example, in one of the first substantive discussions of what Martinez
requires, the district court in Barnett v. Roper considered a petitioner's
Rule 59(e) motion for reconsideration on a Rule 60(b)(6) motion to
reopen the final judgment in light of Martinez.127 In the course of
granting reconsideration, then granting reopening, and then finding the
petitioner's default excused, the court concluded that the default was
excused when post-conviction counsel failed to properly raise the trialIAC claim, which barred a merits ruling in state court, and that the
underlying trial-IAC claim was substantial. 128 The district court
ultimately granted habeas relief following an evidentiary hearing on the
merits of Barnett's trial-IAC claim. 129 In that order, the district court
reiterated that, by finding inadequate state post-conviction counsel and
finding that the defaulted claim was substantial, it had found the default
excused.130 The court again implied a conflation or modification
approach by stating that their finding of state IRCP IAC "and its natural
consequence (the evaluation of [the claim] on the merits), are consistent
with and fulfills the purposes of the Martinez decision.''
Another judge in the same district arguably followed a conflation
approach in Stevenson v. Wallace.'32 The court explained that "Martinez
reiterated the general principle that '[a] prisoner may obtain federal
review of a defaulted claim by showing cause for the default and
prejudice from a violation of federal law."",133 Martinez, the court
explained, "added to the jurisprudence of the doctrine of procedural
default that such cause can be established by showing that initial-review
post-conviction counsel was ineffective ... in not raising the defaulted

claim."' 134 The court proceeded to find deficient performance by post-

127.

941 F. Supp. 2d 1099, 1102, 1105 (E.D. Mo. 2013); see also FED. R. Cry. P. 59(e),

60(b)(6).
128. Barnett,941 F. Supp. 2datl112-14.
129. Memorandum and Order at 188-89, Barnett v. Roper, 941 F. Supp. 2d 1099 (E.D. Mo.
Aug. 18, 2015) (No. 4:03-cv-00614-ERW).
130. Id. at 157 (explaining that "the Court found the... claim was 'substantial,' and also
determined Mr. Barnett's post-conviction counsel was ineffective under Strickland, meaning [the
claim] fell under the 'second circumstances' enumerated by Martinez, 'which establishes cause for
the default of an [IAC] claim where the appointed counsel in the initial[-]review collateral
proceeding fails to properly raise the claim of ineffective assistance at trial').
131. Id. at 167.
132. No. 4:10-cv-02055, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 103033, at *4-9 (E.D. Mo. July 29, 2014).
133. Id. at *4 (quoting Martinez v. Ryan, 132 S. Ct. 1309, 1316 (2012)) (alteration in the
original).
134. Id. at *4-5.
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conviction counsel for failing to raise a claim of trial-LAC (trial counsel
failed to move to strike a biased juror). 135 The court explained that the
record suggested the juror in question was, indeed, actually biased
against the petitioner, in "a way that may establish a violation of
Petitioner's constitutional right to the effective assistance of trial
counsel.' 3 6 The court ordered an evidentiary hearing on the merits of
the "potentially-meritorious" claim.1 37 It did not explicitly address the
substantiality question or the "actual prejudice" question other than to
note that, if it concluded following the hearing that trial counsel's
performance was deficient in not moving to strike the biased juror, "the
presumed prejudice in that context will satisfy the prejudice requirement
1 38
to excuse the procedural default.
2. The Minority/Outlier Approach: Enhancement Beyond What
Martinez!Trevino Require
Although the majority of courts, thus far, have concluded that
satisfying the four-part MartinezITrevino test successfully excuses a
procedural default, a few courts have implicitly or explicitly embraced
an outlier approach. Under this outlier approach, a petitioner who can
demonstrate all four enumerated Martinez/Trevino elements-including
substantiality-has only demonstrated "cause," and something more
must still be shown to establish "actual prejudice" from that cause, and,
thereby, excuse the default. 39 Typically these courts have required a
petitioner to prove that he or she would prevail on
the merits of the
40
defaulted claims before finding the default excused. 1
Of course, careful readers will remember Judge Fletcher in Detrich
explained that requiring a petitioner to prevail on the merits of his
defaulted claim before the default can be excused under
MartinezITrevino would render the "substantiality" requirement in
Martinez element (1) superfluous. 14 1 It would also be illogical, because it

135. Id. at *6-7.
136. Id. at *7.
137. Id. at *8-9.
138. Id. at *9. It is not entirely clear whether the Stevenson court was referring to prejudice
from IRCP counsel's deficient performance, or prejudice from trial counsel's deficient performance,
or some combination of both.
139. Canales v. Stephens, 765 F.3d 551, 567-68 (5th Cir. 2014).
140. See, e.g., id. at 568.
141. Detrich v. Ryan, 740 F.3d 1237, 1246 (9th Cir. 2013) (en banc) (plurality opinion).
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would require a petitioner to prove he would win on the merits of his
defaulted claim before the default could be excused-and, therefore,
before he has ever been afforded any meaningful opportunity for factual
development as required by Trevino. The error in that outlier approach is
self-evident upon further examination, especially when Trevino specifies
the procedural elements that must be afforded a petitioner before a
meaningful review of the merits can be given.
The outlier approach is an enhanced standard, above and beyond
what the four-element Martinez/Trevino test contemplates. It typically
focuses on the Martinez Court's use of the term "cause" in its opinion
without the accompanying term "prejudice."' 142 In effect, this mechanical
and rigid application of Coleman's "cause and actual prejudice" standard
erroneously forces a case presenting a MartinezITrevino scenario into
the Coleman framework, even though the Court in Martinez and Trevino
was explicitly creating an equitable exception to Coleman's
requirements. It also ignores the distinction the Supreme Court made in
Martinez regarding the difference between overcoming a default via a
MartinezITrevino argument and a full merits review of the defaulted
claim. 143 In short, this outlier approach contravenes Supreme Court
authority and should be rejected as such.

142. At the tail end of the Martinez majority opinion, the Court recited what the lower court
had-and had not-done. Martinez v. Ryan, 132 S. Ct. 1309, 1320-21 (2012). Specifically, the
lower court concluded only that there was no constitutional right to effective post-conviction
counsel, and, thus, "the attorney's errors in the initial-review collateral proceeding could not
establish cause for the failure to comply with the State's rules." Id.at 1321. Consequently, the lower
court "did not determine whether Martinez's attorney in his first collateral proceeding was
ineffective or whether his claim of ineffective assistance of trial counsel is substantial. And the
court did not address the question of prejudice." Id. The court expressly noted that "[t]hese issues
remain open for a decision on remand." Id. While at first blush these dicta sentences might appear to
support the third option, that should not be so upon further review.
First, the sentences in question are, again, dicta-not the Court's holding. And second, the
Court's recitation suggested a distinction between "determinations" of adequacy of IRCP counsel
and of substantiality, on the one hand, and "the question of prejudice" on the other. Id. The
"question" of prejudice for the court to consider on remand can be read literally: not only "was the
prisoner prejudiced?" but, as an initial matter, how should the court assess prejudicein this unique
context?
143. Martinez, 132 S.Ct. at 1320 (explaining that excusing a default via a Martinez argument
of post-conviction-IAC "does not entitle the prisoner to habeas relief Itmerely allows a federal
court to consider the merits of a claim that otherwise would have been procedurally defaulted"). The
Court would not have included this explicit distinction if it was also holding that a petitioner was
required to definitively prove he would prevail-obtain habeas relief-on the merits of his defaulted
claim before the default could be excused.
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Aside from some district courts in Tennessee, 144 and a district court
in Pennsylvania, 145 the Fifth Circuit is the primary outlier, and even then,
its own circuit law is internally inconsistent. On one hand, some
courts-including panels of the Fifth Circuit-have applied the majority
approach.1 46 On the other hand, a few courts have required more than the
four-part MartinezITrevino
showings before a petitioner can overcome
147
a default.
To understand the Fifth Circuit's muddled jurisprudence on this
issue, it should be noted that the court's Martinez jurisprudence is
unique in that it has generally considered Martinez issues in the course
of rejecting a COA on the underlying claim(s).1 48 Accordingly, that court
frequently "looks through" the Martinez arguments to determine the
underlying claims are meritless, therefore not substantial, and, as such,
the default cannot be excused. 149 By requiring the petitioner to
demonstrate that he would prevail on the ultimate merits of his defaulted
claim(s) in order to prove his claims are substantial-before receiving a
meaningful opportunity to investigate and expand the record that is, by
definition, undeveloped-the Fifth Circuit flatly disregards Trevino's
holding and analysis that require meaningful opportunity for factual
development that precedes a likewise-mandated meaningful merits
review, even as the Fifth Circuit and its district courts purport to apply a
two-part Martinez test. 150
The primary outlier culprit in the Fifth Circuit is Canales v.
Stephens.15 1 The Fifth Circuit explained that a petitioner attempting to
excuse a procedural default must establish both inadequate IRCP
counsel and that the underlying claim is substantial. 152 So far, so good.
But the court continued: "To excuse the procedural default fully,
144.

See supra notes 95-97 and accompanying text. Note, however, that the Duncan court's

approach, although still doctrinally problematic, was perhaps not quite as problematic in effect,
since the petitioner in that case had been given a rather comprehensive evidentiary hearing as part of
his second state post-conviction proceedings, and the federal habeas court had given the parties an
opportunity to submit supplemental briefing on Martinez-specific issues. See Duncan v. Carpenter,
No. 3:88-00992, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 28009, at *1-4, *119-29 (M.D. Tenn. Mar. 4, 2015).
145. Spann v. Shannon, No. 12-4007, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 105874, at *15-17 (E.D. Pa. July
29, 2013).
146. See supra notes 107-12 and accompanying text.
147. See infra notes 151-65 and accompanying text.
148. See, e.g., Newbury v. Stephens, 756 F.3d 850, 852-53, 868-73 (5th Cir. 2014).
149. See, e.g., id. at 868-74.
150. See Tabler v. Stephens, 588 F. App'x 297, 305-07 (5th Cir. 2014) (denying COA because,
in part, "Tabler fails to demonstrate that the performance of his state habeas counsel and state trial
counselwas constitutionally deficient" (emphasis added)).
151. 765 F.3d 551 (5th Cir. 2014).
152. Id.at 567-68.
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Canales would then be required to prove that he suffered prejudice from
the ineffective assistance of his trialcounsel." '1 3 This statement suggests
that a petitioner must prove the ultimate merits of his defaulted claim, as
an extra "actual prejudice" element beyond the four-part
Martinez!Trevino test, before the default can be "fully" excused.
Careful reading of Canales presents several takeaways from the
panel's analysis: (1) there is a difference between "cause" and "actual
prejudice" under Martinez; (2) "cause" to excuse a procedural default
via Martinez is established by showing that state IRCP counsel
performed deficiently-as distinguished from showing that state IRCP
counsel was ineffective-and that a petitioner's defaulted claim is
substantial; (3) before a federal habeas court may reject a petitioner's
MartinezITrevino arguments and dismiss a claim as procedurally
defaulted, the federal habeas petitioner must be afforded a meaningful
opportunity for factual development on the allegedly defaulted claim and
his Martinez/Trevino arguments; 154 and (4) "prejudice" from state IRCP
counsel's deficient performance for Martinez purposes is coextensive
with "prejudice" from trial counsel's deficient performance-that is, if
trial counsel's deficient performance is ultimately proven prejudicial
after proper development of the evidentiary record, then the petitioner
was ipso facto prejudiced by his state IRCP counsel's failure to raise
55
the claim. 1
In other words, Canales collapsed the questions of excusing a
default and granting relief on the merits of the defaulted claim into one
inquiry: if a petitioner can show he warrants habeas relief on his
defaulted claim, then the default will be excused. Under the Canales
panel's reading of Martinez and Trevino, a petitioner must show he
would prevail on the merits of his defaulted claim in order to excuse the
default and obtain the merits ruling to which he is entitled. 156 Failure to
153. Id. at 568 (emphasis added).
154. In Canales, the court rejected the State's argument that it should deny Canales the
opportunity to have an evidentiary hearing if it remanded the case. Id at 571 n.2. The court left the
determination of whether to hold an evidentiary hearing to the district court. Id. Nevertheless, the
Fifth Circuit's stated concern that a remand was necessary--even in the face of extensive
documentary evidence that Canales was able to submit with his federal habeas petition-because
Canales "has not yet had the chance to develop the factual basis for this claim because ... it was
procedurally defaulted," should be read as a thinly veiled instruction to the district court to allow
full factual development, which would include an evidentiary hearing. Id. at 571. Even though the
court's analysis of what a petitioner must show to excuse a procedural default is an outlier that
disfavors habeas petitioners, the court's reasoning involving evidentiary development is neither an
outlier nor disadvantageous to habeas petitioners.
155. Id. at567-68.
156. Id. at 568.
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fully prove a winning trial-LAC claim will result in the default not being

excused. Conversely, if you prove deficient performance by state IRCP
counsel for failing to raise a claim, and prove the full merits of a
winning trial-IAC claim, then the default will be excused, the federal
habeas court will no longer be precluded157from addressing the merits of
the petition, and the writ will be granted.
But, these conclusions are inconsistent

with

previous

and

subsequent Fifth Circuit opinions, which state simply that a petitioner
will excuse a procedural default by satisfying the two-part Martinez-preTrevino test, or the four-part MartinezITrevino test.158 And while the

Fifth Circuit's opinion generated a favorable outcome for petitioner
Canales on at least one of his trial-lAC claims, 159 the Canales court's

analysis puts the analytical cart before the horse; it is the rare case,
indeed, in which a federal habeas petitioner will be able to present to the
courts sufficient evidence to prove the merits of his defaulted claim
before the default is excused and the petitioner is granted a meaningful
opportunity to investigate the factual record.
Further undermining any significance to Canales is the fact that

district court treatment of Canales is inconsistent. One district court
160
within the Fifth Circuit cited Canalesto follow the majority approach.
A different district court in the Fifth Circuit applied Canales and

Martinez/Trevino in a way that vividly underscores the "through the
157. This analysis echoes that offered by the district court in Duncan v. Carpenter:
As a practical matter, then, in many habeas cases where a petitioner seeks to overcome
procedural default under Martinez, it will be more efficient for the reviewing court to
consider in the first instance whether the alleged underlying [IAC] was "substantial"
enough to satisfy the "actual prejudice" prong of Coleman. If not, the court would have
no need to consider whether the petitioner has established deficient performance by postconviction counsel.
No. 3:88-00992, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 28009, *118-19 (M.D. Tenn. Mar. 4, 2015). The court's
observation that substantiality might be most efficiently assessed at the outset is astute. Where the
Duncan court veered into error territory was its use of the qualifier "enough" after "substantial" to
mean "substantial enough to warrant relief," and its corresponding equation of that substantiality
requirement-an elevated requirement above the requirement for substantiality articulated in
Martinez or Trevino-to Coleman's actual prejudice inquiry.
158. See supra notes 107-12 and accompanying text.
159. Canales, 765 F.3d at 567-68,571.
160. Cole v. Stephens, No. H-13-3003, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 178404, at *16-19 (S.D. Tex.
Nov. 5, 2014). The court in Cole, explained:
Martinez and Trevino allow procedural defaults of ineffectiveness claims to be overcome
if it can be shown that: (1) the petitioner either did not have counsel in his state habeas
proceeding or his state habeas attorney's representation fell below the standards
established in Strickland and (2) the petitioner's underlying ineffective-assistance claim
is "substantial," meaning that it "has some merit."
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looking glass" nature of federal habeas circa 2014.161 In short, the court
in Rhodes v. Cain found the pro se petitioner had shown deficient
performance by his trial counsel and prejudice therefrom, and, thus, had
demonstrated that his Sixth Amendment right to effective counsel was
denied.1 62 But, because the claim was defaulted, the court concluded, the
petitioner needed to "establish cause for failing to raise this claim
1 63
properly in the state court" in order to obtain a writ of habeas corpus.
Applying Martinez/Trevino through Canales, the district court explained
the test to overcome the default as follows:
With respect to [Canales] prong 1, a petitioner must demonstrate
that his IATC claim is substantial, i.e., that it "has some merit."
However, [Canales] prongs 1 and 4 overlap on this question, and
[Canales] prong 4 requires the petitioner to demonstrate outright
satisfaction of Strickland v. Washington's prejudice requirement on his
IATC claim. While in some cases, it may make sense to consider these
questions separately, in this case, the parties have briefed the merits of
this IATC claim exhaustively. The Court will therefore analyze the
merit of the IATC claim fully, understanding that the merit of the
claim would necessarily satisfy [Canales] prongs 1 and 4; the
absence of merit would render the remainder of the Martinez test a
moot point. 164
In other words, where Judge Fletcher saw superfluous language in
Detrich, the court in Rhodes saw only "overlap" between the questions
of substantiality and whether petitioner was 65"actually prejudiced"
because his defaulted claim was a winning claim. 1
B. So Now What?
At the core of any conflict between the majority approach and the
outlier approach is a fundamental question: does it (or should it) really
matter if we categorize the MartineziTrevino elements in an effort
to shoehorn them into boxes labeled "cause," and/or "prejudice"
and/or something additional? Such intellectual wrestling, although
fodder for the scholarly publication grist mill, seems to elevate form
over substance.
161. Rhodes v. Cain, No. 11-0399, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 132573, at *30-33 (E.D. La. Sept.
19, 2014).
162. Id. at *56.
163. Id.
164. Id.at *32-33 (emphasis added) (citations omitted).
165. Detrich v. Ryan, 740 F.3d 1237, 1246 (9th Cir. 2013) (en banc) (plurality opinion);
Rhodes, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 132573, at *32-33.

Published by Scholarly Commons at Hofstra Law, 2015

29

Hofstra Law Review, Vol. 43, Iss. 4 [2015], Art. 1

HOFSTRA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 43:945

The baseline consideration in the MartinezTrevino context is what
a petitioner must demonstrate to excuse a procedural default and obtain a
meaningful merits review of his defaulted claim, when there was no
meaningful opportunity for a meaningful review in state-court
proceedings due to IRCP counsel's failures. 166 And, the Supreme Court
bluntly answered this question in Trevino: if a petitioner can satisfy the
four articulated Martinez!Trevino elements as to a defaulted claim, then
the procedural default is "thereby excus[ed].' 67 Any different approach
168
would be erroneously failing to take the Trevino Court at its word.
The Court has articulated the four elements that, if demonstrated, excuse
a procedural default. The labels assigned to particular parts of the
analysis should be irrelevant in view of the Court's pronouncement.
Similarly, the labels used are irrelevant in light of the ultimate
of a claim available to the prisoner
consideration: is meaningful review
169
not?
it
is
or
habeas,
in federal
Accordingly, I submit that the majority approach is faithful to the
Court's intent in Martinez and Trevino, but the outlier approach is not.
The Supreme Court is free to define-and revise-its own equitable
rules, including the Coleman rule. 170 Whether the Court's Trevino
pronouncement is a revision or redefinition of its own equitable rules is,
thus, irrelevant; if it was not, then so be it, and if it was, then that was
certainly within the Court's equitable power. Moreover, whether
166. Trevino v. Thaler, 133 S.Ct. 1911, 1921 (2013); see also Woolbright v. Crews, 2015 U.S.
App. LEXIS 11043, at *22 (6th Cir. June 29, 2015) (emphasizing the petitioner had "thus far
been unable to obtain an evidentiary hearing on his IATC claims in either state post-conviction
and that the "absence of factual
proceedings or federal habeas proceedings,"
development.., nullifies a key advantage of bringing such IATC claims in collateral proceedings").
167. Id. at 1918.
168. See Hodges v. Colson, 727 F.3d 517, 531 (6th Cir. 2013) (declaring that one must assume
that "the Supreme Court meant exactly what it wrote").
169. One commentator has suggested that a proper Martinez/Trevino inquiry involves three
different determinations of prejudice: first, to determine substantiality under Martinez!Trevino
element (1); second, to determine whether IRCP counsel provided ineffective assistance under
Martinez/Trevino element (2); and third, to determine "actual prejudice" under the Coleman "cause
and prejudice" standard. Michael Ellis, Comment, A Tale of Three Prejudices: Restructuring the
"Martinez Gateway," 90 WASH. L. REv. 405, 441-51 (2015). The commentator then suggests that
all three prejudice inquiries "should be collapsed into a single analysis focused on the Martinez
'substantiality' prong" if "the Martinez first prong is to have any practical effect." Id. at 443; see
also id.at 448 (reconfirming this notion). While the commentator's suggested approach is subtly
different than the analysis and suggestions presented in this article, the commentator's proposed
bottom-line result is largely the same: evidentiary development and meaningful opportunity for
factual development must be afforded to ensure a meaningful merits review of the underlying claim.
170. Martinez v. Ryan, 132 S. Ct. 1309, 1318 (2012) ("The rules for when a prisoner
may establish cause to excuse a procedural default are elaborated in the exercise of the
Court's discretion.").
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Martinez and Trevino constitute a revision or a "relaxed version" of the
general Coleman rule-as the Supreme Court, the Ninth Circuit, and
some district courts say they do-or whether the new equitable rule
simply establishes the way by which default may be excused in a factspecific context, it is clear the Supreme Court intended to allow a
petitioner to obtain merits review of a defaulted claim in federal habeas
if he satisfies the four MartineziTrevino elements. 171 Insisting on
identifying the correct labels for "cause" and "prejudice" is formalism
without purpose.
Moreover, the outlier approach, at least in the ordinary case, is
irreconcilable with Trevino's mandates and the constitutional concerns
that animated Martinez and Trevino. The core of Martinez and Trevino,
the Court's constitutional motivation, was the Court's concern for
protecting the fundamental, bedrock right to effective assistance of
counsel, and the Court's belief that it absolutely undermines confidence
in the reliability of proceedings if even a single substantial trial-IAC
claim has never been reviewed on the merits.1 72 The federal merits
review that a petitioner seeks via Martinez and Trevino is not just
perfunctory review. Martinez suggests, and Trevino explicitly demands,
that it must be "meaningful" review.1 73 Martinez suggests, and Trevino
explicitly establishes, what a petitioner must be afforded in order to have
a meaningful opportunity to obtain a meaningful review. 174 The outlier
approach, by deciding the ultimate merits question in the course of
deciding whether the default can be excused, would functionally require
a petitioner to prove he will be entitled to habeas relief on a defaulted
claim before being afforded a meaningful opportunity to investigate and
litigate his claim.
True, there may be some cases in which a petitioner has somehow
obtained evidence to present to the federal habeas court with his petition
to support his Martinez/Trevino arguments and to demonstrate the
ultimate merits of his defaulted claim. Indeed, that was partly the
situation in Canales and Rhodes. But those cases are the exceptions that
prove the rule. When a petitioner requires a meaningful opportunity171. Trevino, 133 S. Ct. at 1918.
172. See id.
at 1917-18, 1921; Martinez, 132 S. Ct. at 1317-18.
173. Trevino, 133 S. Ct. at 1917, 1921; see Martinez, 132 S. Ct. at 1317-18.
174. Among the procedures that are necessary to ensure a meaningful opportunity for factual
development and, in turn, a meaningful merits review of a constitutional claim, are the following:
new, effective counsel; sufficient time for new counsel to investigate and develop the claim, and to
raise the federal constitutional claim in compliance with procedural rules; and an opportunity to
expand the evidentiary record, including an evidentiary hearing. See Trevino, 133 S. Ct. at 1921;
Martinez, 132 S. Ct. at 1317-18.
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time; appointment of new, effective counsel; court-authorized funding;
and process to obtain and present the necessary evidence-to support his
Martinez!Trevino arguments and the full-blown merits of his underlying
defaulted claim, that meaningful opportunity is typically only available
after the default has been excused. 175 Requiring the petitioner to
demonstrate that he will obtain relief on the merits of his defaulted claim
before he has a meaningful opportunity to investigate, obtain, and
present that evidence-as the outlier approach does-is illogical at best,
and directly contrary to Martinez and Trevino. 76 Only in the context
contemplated by SasserI and Sasser II-a federal district court deciding
whether default can be excused following everything necessary to ensure
a meaningful opportunity to present the defaulted claim for a meaningful
merits review-would
the outlier approach be in accord with Martinez
77
and Trevino.'
III.

WHAT DOES "SUBSTANTIAL" MEAN AND How DOES IT MATTER?

The first enumerated Martinez/Trevino factor is whether a defaulted
claim is "substantial. '7 8 The Court referenced the COA standard to
define what "substantial" means in the Martinez context.1 79 The COA
standard, in turn, requires less than proving that a petitioner would
prevail on the claim in question. 180 Indeed, the Court has previously
explained that a decision in
the COA inquiry should NOT be a full18
blown merits determination. 1

175. See Trevino, 133 S.Ct. at 1921.
176. It is also contrary to analogous Supreme Court authority addressing the other avenue
through which a petitioner can excuse a procedural default: the "miscarriage of justice" avenue.
Such an argument requires the petitioner "to support his allegations of constitutional error with new
reliable evidence-whether it be exculpatory scientific evidence, trustworthy eyewitness accounts,
or critical physical evidence-that was not presented at trial." Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S. 298, 324
(1995). Discussing that evidentiary requirement in a later opinion, the Court explained that "[a]
petitioner's burden at th[is] gateway stage is to demonstrate that more likely than not, in light of the
new evidence ....any reasonable juror would have reasonable doubt." House v. Bell, 547 U.S. 518,
538 (2006). Like the "miscarriage of justice" avenue, the MartinezITrevino route to excusing
a procedural default is but a "gateway stage" regarding the underlying, defaulted claim, and a
petitioner should not be required to prove the full merits of his defaulted claim at this
"gateway stage."
177. See Sasser II, 743 F.3d 1151, 1151 (8th Cir. 2014); Sasser I, 735 F.3d 833, 851, 853-55
(8th Cir. 2013).
178. Trevino, 133 S.Ct. at 1918; Martinez, 132 S. Ct. at 1318.
179. See Martinez, 132 S. Ct. at 1318-19 (referencing Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322
(2003), which discusses the standards to issuing a COA).
180. Miller-El, 537 U.S. at 342.
181. Id.
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It follows, then, that inquiring into whether a defaulted claim is
"substantial" is a different inquiry than whether the defaulted claim, if
considered on the merits after a meaningful opportunity for factual
development, would prevail. And, this is not a distinction without a
difference, whether doctrinally or practically, due to the very
circumstances and equitable considerations that give rise to a
MartinezITrevino situation. A prisoner might be able to satisfy the
relatively low COA bar with allegations of a constitutional claim
supported by at least some facts. Such a claim is debatable or deserves
further investigation, and thus, after the default is excused, the prisoner
should be afforded an opportunity for meaningful investigation and
litigation of the defaulted claim.
However, if a prisoner has never had a meaningful opportunity to
investigate and develop the factual bases for a constitutional claim, due
to inadequate IRCP counsel, then the prisoner will unlikely be able to
definitively prove at the preliminary review stage that he should prevail
on the merits of that constitutional claim in federal habeas review. After
all, how can he prevail without the necessary evidence, which could only
have been obtained through a meaningful investigation 1of
the claim82
counsel?
IRCP
inadequate
of
because
done
not
was
which
Some federal courts have explicitly identified this difference
between full merits review and substantiality review, and proceeded
accordingly. But, others have explicitly required at least some quantum
of proof of the merits of the defaulted claim-if not full proof that relief
is required-as part of a Martinez/Trevino analysis, while still others
183
have implicitly done the same.
A.

What the FederalCourts Have Done

One of the first opinions to articulate a difference between
substantiality and proof sufficient to prevail on the merits was the 2013
order in Barnett v. Roper.1 84 Another well-articulated opinion explaining
the distinction between a merits review and the substantiality inquiry can
be found in Weber v. Sinclair. 85 In Weber, the petitioner presented to

182. Woolbright, 2015 U.S. App. LEXIS 11043, at *22-23 (explaining that the lack of an
evidentiary hearing in state IRCP or federal habeas proceedings "hamstrings" a federal habeas
court's ability to meaningfully review a constitutional claim).
183.

See infra Part HI.A.

184. 941 F. Supp. 2d 1099, 1113 (E.D. Mo. 2013).
185. No. C08-1676RSL, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 58849, at *17-19 (W.D. Wash. Apr. 28,
2014).
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186
the district court a list of numerous allegations of counsel's failures.
The district court found the petitioner had satisfied the Martinez
substantiality standard, while explicitly stating that it reached that
decision "[w]ithout passing judgment on the merits of petitioner's IAC
claim."'1 87 The court explained that substantiality "requires a petitioner to
demonstrate that 'reasonable jurists could debate whether ... the petition
should have been resolved in a different manner or that the issues
presented were adequate to deserve encouragement to proceed
further.""' 188 And, "[b]ased on petitioner's list of alleged pre-trial and
trial errors, ... the Court flound] that 'reasonable jurists could debate'
deficiently."'' 89
performed
trial-counsel
petitioner's
whether
Furthermore, the court concluded, the alleged errors "potentially resulted
in prejudice as they cast doubt upon the primary state witness's
identification of petitioner."' 90 Thus, "'[r]easonable jurists could debate'
whether the 'decision reached would reasonably likely have been
different absent the errors,"' and, therefore, the petitioner satisfied the
Martinez substantiality requirement.' 9'
The district court in Sanders v. White carefully applied the
"debatable amongst jurists of reason" standard in its Martinez/Trevino
assessment, distinguishing that inquiry from a full merits inquiry. 192 The
court ultimately concluded that the petitioner should be permitted to
pursue discovery regarding his procedurally defaulted trial-IAC claimand discovery regarding his Martinez/Trevino arguments-because the
defaulted claim was substantial and the IRCP LAC allegations deserved
further evidentiary development.' 93 Only after further evidentiary
development, the court reasoned, was it possible to engage in a full,
meaningful merits review of the underlying trial-lAC claim. 194
A trio of district court opinions from the District of Idaho, likewise,
specified that the substantiality inquiry is "not the same as a merits
review," but rather is "more akin to a preliminary review" of a trial-IAC

186. Id. at* 15-25.
187. Id. at'*18-19.
188. Id. at *17-18 (quoting Detrich v. Ryan, 740 F.3d 1237, 1245 (9th Cir. 2013) (en banc)
(plurality opinion)).
189. Id. at *19 (finding that the "petitioner's allegations that trial-counsel failed to adequately
question the victim concerning his assailant's haircut, failed to present evidence that a phone area
code tattoo is very common, failed to elicit testimony about the 'Boxer' nickname, and failed to
properly interview key witnesses meet the standard of 'substantial' under Martinez").
190. Id
191. Id.
192. No. 03-455-ART, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 91633, at *17-20 (E.D. Ky. July 15, 2015).
193. Id. at *17-25.
194. Id. at *28-33.
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1 95
claim "for purposes of determining whether a [COA] should issue.5
Thus, the Tellez- Vasquez v. Smith court explained:

[T]o determine whether a claim is substantial, Martinez requires the
district court to review but not determine whether trial or appellate
counsel's acts or omissions resulted in deficient performance and in a
reasonable probability of prejudice, and to determine only whether
resolution of the merits of the claim would be debatable among jurists
of reason and the96 issues are deserving enough to encourage further
pursuit of them. 1

The importance of including factual allegations that might, if
ultimately proven, prove a trial-IAC claim, or of presenting to the
federal habeas court some kind of preliminary evidence in support of the
defaulted trial-IAC claim such as affidavits from relevant parties can be
seen in some cases.' 97 Indeed, if evidence can be obtained and presented
to the habeas court in support of a petition's MartineziTrevino
arguments, that evidence can directly affect the court's determination of
whether the default can be excused. 198 But, there is a critical distinction
between a court considering evidence, such as affidavits or sworn
declarations, in addition to sufficiently detailed allegations of ineffective
assistance in its determination of the substantiality inquiry, and a court
requiring such additional evidence before it will find a defaulted claim
substantial. The former complies with the Supreme Court's COA
jurisprudence, while the latter contravenes it.1 99

195. Workman v. Blades, No. 1:08-CV-00052, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 136607, at *24-25 (D.
Idaho Sept. 24, 2014); Tellez-Vasquez v. Smith, No. 1: 10-cv-00406-CWD, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
131662, at *14-15 (D. Idaho Sept. 15, 2014); Ngabirano v. Wengler, No. 1:11-CV-00450, 2014
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15922, at *22-23 (D. Idaho Feb. 7, 2014).
196. 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 131662, at *15.
197. See, e.g., Preyor v. Stephens, 537 F. App'x 412, 422-25 (5th Cir. 2013) (affirming the
district court's conclusion that the petitioner's defaulted trial-IAC claims were not substantial in part
because petitioner had not presented any specific factual allegations about counsel's failures, nor
any evidence such as affidavits from trial counsel or potential witnesses, that would go to showing
how and why counsel's assistance was ineffective); Davis v. Warden, No. 2:05-cv-01 179-KJDNJK, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 122637, at *9-10, *14-15 (D. Nev. Aug. 27, 2013) (holding that
defaulted failure-to-advise IAC claims were not substantial when no allegations were presented
regarding how or whether counsel advised petitioner to testify).
198. See Canales v. Stephens, 765 F.3d 551, 569-71 (5th Cir. 2014) (finding petitioner's state
habeas counsel performed deficiently and that petitioner's trial-IAC claim was substantial, based on
voluminous allegations and evidence presented to federal habeas court, including declaration from
trial counsel stating that counsel did no mitigation investigation, and other, preliminary evidence of
unpresented mitigation evidence).
199. See supra text accompanying notes 179-81.
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So Now What?

A bottom-line understanding of the substantiality requirement is
best framed as a two-part analysis: first, what a petitioner is not required
to do, followed by what is required.
The first step is minding the Supreme Court's admonishment that
the COA inquiry does not require that a petitioner prove he would
definitively prevail on the merits of his claim, and that courts should not
"make a definitive inquiry" into the claim's merits, because a "COA
determination is... distinct from the underlying merits. 200
Then, once the distinction between substantiality and the full merits
of a claim is established, the substantiality of the claim can be more
effectively argued. Taking the Supreme Court at its word, a petitioner
should be able to satisfy the Martinez/Trevino substantiality requirement
in any of the three ways discussed above. 20 1 Thus, a petitioner should be
able to satisfy the substantiality requirement by showing the defaulted
claim has "some merit"-that is, the claim is not totally meritlessbecause, for instance, there are allegations regarding counsel's
performance and prejudice therefrom, or even some modicum of
evidence such as affidavits from counsel or other potential witnesses that
support the claim.
By the same token, a petitioner should be able to satisfy the
substantiality requirement by showing that reasonable jurists could
debate the merits of the defaulted claim-that is, that reasonable jurists
could debate whether trial counsel performed deficiently, and whether
the specific state-court outcome at issue would likely have been
different if counsel had performed sufficiently. 20 2 This, too, may require
some amount of evidentiary development, or perhaps citation to other
cases involving similar issues that were decided favorably for the
petitioner to establish that other jurists have found resolution of similar
issues debatable.
Further, a petitioner should also be able to satisfy the substantiality
requirement by showing that the issues presented by his defaulted claim
"deserve encouragement to proceed further" because, for example, the
trial-IAC claim relates to significant mitigation evidence never
investigated or presented, or counsel's failures involving errors that
20 3
would be harmful or prejudicial per se if considered on the merits.

200.
201.
202.
203.

Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322, 342 (2003).
See supra Part III.A.
See supra notes 195-98 and accompanying text.
Workman v. Blades, No. 1:08-CV-00052, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 136607, at *24-25 (D.
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Counsel's task, in short, is to somehow demonstrate to the habeas
court, whether by detailed allegations, or preliminary evidence, or
something else, that there is "something there," and not just a trial-JAC
claim that would be worthless and underserving of relief even if
ultimately reviewed on the merits.
lV. HOW To ASSESS POST-CONVICTION COUNSEL'S PERFORMANCE?

A question that has thus far received little attention, but which will
undoubtedly push its way into view, is how post-conviction counsel's
performance should be assessed. To find IAC under Strickland v.
Washington, a court must determine whether counsel's performance was
objectively unreasonable as measured against the prevailing professional
norms, or determine that counsel's performance was "outside the wide
range of professionally competent assistance. 2 4 Unfortunately, the
"Supreme Court in Martinez did little to adumbrate a standard for
ineffective assistance of post-conviction counsel beyond saying
Strickland v. Washington ...would provide the governing standard. 20 5
But for decades, IRCP counsel's effectiveness was constitutionally and
equitably irrelevant in the Court's habeas jurisprudence. Thus, while the
prevailing professional norms for trial counsel and direct appeals
counsel have been the subject of much discussion by the federal courts
for years, the same is not necessarily true as to IRCP counsel. Similarly,
what constitutes the "wide range of professionally competent assistance"
for post-conviction counsel has not received significant attention.
Following MartinezITrevino, of course, establishing the relevant
professional norms measuring stick is now significant. Similarly,
establishing the bounds of the "wide range of professionally competent
assistance" for post-conviction counsel is significant now, whereas, it
was irrelevant before Martinez. But, which standards should apply to
mark the measuring stick? Those applicable to trial counsel? To direct
appeals counsel? Something else? After all, "the tasks to be performed
and the possibilities of prejudice are quite different on appeal than at
trial, so the Strickland standard is applied to different conduct and

Idaho Sept. 24, 2014).
204. 466 U.S. 668, 687-88, 690 (1984).
205. Landrum v. Anderson, No. 1:96 CV 641, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 118501, at *14-15 (S.D.
Ohio Aug. 22, 2012); see also Detrich v. Ryan, 740 F.3d 1237, 1245 (9th Cit. 2013) (en banc)
(plurality opinion) (explaining that "the Court did not specify the manner in which Strickland
should be applied" to assess IAC of IRCP counsel).
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decisions when ineffective
assistance of appellate counsel claims are
20 6
being considered.,
An ancillary question asks what source(s) of professional norms
should be invoked. In general, prevailing professional norms against
which to measure an attorney's performance can be drawn from myriad
sources, including such things as: case law; state or federal statutes or
other rules; professional standards established by state or federal
agencies, such as the federal Department of Justice; publications of
private state or national organizations, such as the American Bar
Association, the National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers, or
the National Legal Aid and Defender Association; training manuals or
similar educational materials; or scholarship published in legal
journals. 20 7 The body of case law explicitly discussing the prevailing
professional norms applicable to IRCP counsel is slim to nonexistent at
this time. That is not a surprise, given the massive shift in significance
attributable to IRCP counsel's performance from irrelevant to potentially
hugely significant. That cannot mean, however, that there are no
professional norms under which IRCP counsel labored pre-Martinez.
A.

What the FederalCourts Have Done

Federal courts' discussion of this issue has been limited, but the
courts have generally applied the standards applicable to trial counsel,208
206. Landrum, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 118501, at *15 (citation omitted).
207. See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687-89.
208. See, e.g., Tabler v. Stephens, 591 F. App'x 281, 281 (5th Cir. 2015), vacating in part 588
F. App'x 297 (5th Cir. 2014) (applying MartinezITrevino to circumstances in which state habeas
counsel's failures prevented an initial-review collateral proceeding from ever taking place, because
counsel allowed prisoner to waive state habeas proceedings without an adversarial process to test
his competency to do so); Canales v. Stephens, 765 F.3d 551, 569-70 (5th Cir. 2014) (finding state
habeas counsel's performance deficient when counsel failed to seek funding for investigation and
comparing state habeas counsel's deficient performance to trial counsel's deficient performance
discussed in Hinton v. Alabama, 134 S.Ct. 1081, 1088-89 (2014) (per curiam)); Wessinger v. Cain,
No. 04-637-JJB-SCR, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 97266, at *4-12 (M.D. La. July 27, 2015) (finding,
after evidentiary hearing with experts testifying to professional norms for post-conviction counsel,
deficient performance by state post-conviction counsel); see also In re Commonwealth's Motion to
Appoint Counsel Against or Directed to Defender Ass'n of Phila., 790 F.3d 457, 2015 U.S. App.
LEXIS 9878, at *32-33 (3d Cir. June 12, 2015) (stating that because state-court proceedings are,
under AEDPA, "the central process, not just a preliminary step for a later federal habeas
proceeding," post-conviction counsel "must be careful to comply with state procedural rules, file
within applicable limitations periods, and fully exhaust their clients' claims in order to secure
meaningful habeas review in federal court"); id at *47-59 (McKee, C.J., concurring) (extensive
discussion of importance of state post-conviction proceedings in modem habeas jurisprudence,
including the first opportunity to investigate, raise, and preserve claims; discussing the need for a
"thoroughly investigated and well-presented petition" to "ensure that petitioners' claims are fully
heard and appropriately decided on the merits, rather than going unresolved in federal court because
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or declined to articulate any particular standard at all, choosing instead
to simply determine whether post-conviction counsel's performance was
so incompetent as to be outside the wide range of professionally
competent assistance. °9
For instance, in Leberry v. Howerton, the Sixth Circuit seemed to
suggest an ipso facto approach; failing to raise a trial-IAC claim is
deficient performance by post-conviction counsel if that claim is
substantial. 210 Leberry's post-conviction counsel failed to raise the trialIAC claims in question, rendering them defaulted in federal habeas.21 1
The court found that "under Martinez... and Trevino ... Leberry can
establish cause., 2 12 This suggests an implicit finding that post-conviction
counsel's failure to raise the trial-TAC claims was deficient
performance.21 3 Chief Judge McKee's concurring opinion in In re
Commonwealth's Motion to Appoint Counsel Against or Directed to
Defender Association of Philadelphiais also noteworthy in its extended
discussion of all the things post-conviction counsel must do to ensure
effective representation at that stage, many of which are akin to trial

of earlier procedural defects;" and emphasizing the "significant investigation" required by postconviction counsel, "the important investigative and substantive legal work that an attorney must
undertake during post-conviction proceedings in state court," and post-conviction counsel's
additional obligations to ensure compliance with state and AEDPA's procedural rules).
209. Leberry v. Howerton, 583 F. App'x 497, 500-01 (6th Cir. 2014); Barnett v. Roper, 941 F.
Supp. 2d 1099, 1114 n.17 (E.D. Mo. 2013) ("[T]he state motion court's determination that Bamett's
post-conviction counsel[] failed to comply with the state procedural rule, which barred review on
the merits, establishes deficient performance and a reasonable probability of prejudice under
Strickland."); Miles v. Ryan, 713 F.3d 477, 494 (9th Cir. 2013) (finding post-conviction counsel's
performance was not so incompetent as to be outside the wide range of professionally competent
assistance, when counsel "conducted an extensive investigation during post-conviction review,"
akin to trial counsel's investigative duties); Sheridan v. Curley, No. 10-3987, 2015 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 32406, at *13 (E.D. Pa. Mar. 16, 2015) (citing Glenn v. Wynder, 743 F.3d 402, 409-10 (3d
Cir. 2014)) (stating "[wihere a habeas petitioner argues that his initial-review post-conviction
counsel failed to raise a claim, thus procedurally defaulting it, the petitioner can overcome that
default if he shows" the defaulted claim is substantial (emphasis added)); Landrum v. Anderson,
No. 1:96 CV 641, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 118501, at *18 (S.D. Ohio Aug. 22, 2012) (explaining
that "post-conviction counsel recognized the [trial-IAC claim] and presented it twice in affidavits
attached to the post-conviction petition, but did not actually plead the claim in the body of the
petition," and finding "that to be deficient performance").
210. 583F.App'xat501.
211. Id. at 499.
212. Id. at 498, 500 ("In this case, the warden conceded at oral argument that Sutton resolves
the question of whether Martinez and Trevino apply to Tennessee's procedures; therefore, Leberry
has cause to excuse his defaulted ineffectiveness claims.").
213. See Sheridan v. Curley, No. 10-3987, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 32406, at *13 (E.D. Pa.
Mar. 16, 2015). As articulated by the Sheridan court, if post-conviction counsel's failure to raise a
claim resulted in that claim being procedurally defaulted in federal habeas, that failure becomes
deficient performance if the defaulted claim is substantial.
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counsel's duties to thoroughly investigate and raise claims for the
first time.114
I also note that a few courts have implied or suggested that postconviction counsel's performance might be assessed against the
standards applicable to direct appeal counsel.215
B. So Now What?
The most straightforward answer to the question of how to assess
post-conviction counsel's performance is to follow Leberry and tie that
inquiry directly to the substantiality inquiry. If the defaulted claim is
substantial, and if post-conviction counsel failed to meaningfully
investigate, present, and litigate that substantial claim, then, ipso facto,
post-conviction

counsel failed to perform

sufficiently. 216 So, for

instance, state post-conviction counsel who failed to argue that mental
illness-as opposed to intellectual disability-is a categorical
ineligibility for the death penalty would have performed deficiently,
because a mental illness categorical exemption is certainly within the
definition of "substantial" at this time. So, too, would counsel who failed
to identify and raise issues related to mitigation evidence not presented
to the jury in a capital case.
Furthermore, this ipso facto approach best fits with the prevailing
professional standards for post-conviction counsel, as drawn from
various sources. Among those sources-especially for capital cases-is
the ABA Guidelines for the Appointment and Performance of Defense

214. See supra note 208 and accompanying text. Chief Judge McKee's concurring opinion
suggests post-conviction counsel also shoulders professional obligations akin to direct-appeal
counsel's, such as the duty to preserve all claims in state court to ensure meaningful federal habeas
review, or the duty to ensure timely filing of various pleadings and otherwise compliance with all
state and federal procedural rules. That does not detract from the trial-counsel-related duties to
which post-conviction counsel is subject, but rather reflects the unique, hybrid nature of postconviction counsel's responsibilities.
215. See, e.g., Hittson v. GDCP Warden, 759 F.3d 1210, 1263 (lith Cir. 2014); Folino v.
Harlow, No. 11-1582, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 177441, at *36-39 (W.D. Pa. Dec. 24, 2014);
Runningeagle v. Ryan, No. CV-98-1903-PHX-PGR, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 140289, at *48-52 (D.
Ariz. Oct. 2, 2014); Sampson v. Palmer, No. 3:11 -cv-00019-LRH-WGC, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
43488, at *18-19 (D. Nev. Mar. 31, 2014). It should be noted that the Runningeagle court's
application of appellate-counsel standards to post-conviction counsel's performance was dicta, since
that court held that the Martinez/Trevino exception did not apply in that particular case.
Runningeagle, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 140289, at *24.
216. Leberry, 583 F. App'x at 500-01.
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Counsel in Death Penalty Cases ("ABA Guidelines"), 217 and the
Supplementary Guidelines for the Mitigation Function of Defense
Teams in Death Penalty Cases ("Supplementary Guidelines"). 218 For
example, ABA Guideline 10.15.1 describes the duties of post-conviction
counsel, which include aggressive investigation into all aspects of the
client's case, monitoring of the client's mental, physical, and emotional
condition, and modifying prior counsel's theories of the case, while the
commentary to that Guideline provides more in-depth explanation of
what is expected of post-conviction counsel.21 9 ABA Guideline 10.8
contains a strong mandate to raise every issue of possible conceivable
merit, including ones that are flatly contrary to existing law. 220 There is a
long discussion in the commentary at the beginning of the ABA
Guidelines regarding the duties of post-conviction counsel in state
collateral-review proceedings2 21 that is similarly helpful in articulating
the "[p]revailing norms of practice" 222 and the "standard practice ' 223 for
post-conviction counsel. Similarly, the Supplementary Guidelines
contain a great deal of guidance for counsel to mind, and Supplemental
Guideline 1.1 makes clear that those guides explicitly apply to postconviction counsel just as to counsel at every other stage of a capital
case. 2 24 A significant amount of scholarship has been devoted to
articulating the prevailing professional norms for capital-case
representation 225-including a growing body of scholarship focusing on

217. AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION GUIDELINES FOR THE APPOINTMENT AND PERFORMANCE
OF DEFENSE COUNSEL IN DEATH PENALTY CASES (rev. ed. 2003), in 31 HOFSTRA L. REV. 913
(2003) [hereinafter ABA GUIDELINES], availableat http://www.ambar.org/2003Guidelines.
218. SUPPLEMENTARY GUIDELINES FOR THE MITIGATION FUNCTION OF DEFENSE TEAMS IN
DEATH PENALTY CASES, in 36 HOFSTRA L. REV. 677 (2008) [hereinafter SUPPLEMENTARY
GUIDELINES].
219. ABAGuIDELINES, supranote 217, at 1079-87.

220. Id. at 1028-29.
221. Id. at932-35.
222. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 688 (1984).
223. Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510, 524 (2003).
224. SUPPLEMENTARY GUIDELINES, supra note 218, at 679.
225. Ty Alper, 'So What?': Using Reverse Investigation to Articulate Prejudice and Win PostConviction Claims, 35 CHAMPION 44 (Dec. 2011). See generally Eric M. Freedman, The Revised
ABA Guidelines and the Duties of Lawyers and Judges in CapitalPost-ConvictionProceedings, 5 J.
APP. PRAC. & PROCESS 325 (2003); Russell Stetler & W. Bradley Wendel, The ABA Guidelines and
the Norms of CapitalDefense Representation, 41 HOFSTRA L. REV. 635 (2013).
Attorneys representing capital clients should also be aware of the American Bar
Association's collection of representation performance standards for death penalty cases that is
available exclusively to such practitioners. See Am. Bar Ass'n, NAT'L CAPITAL STANDARDS
DATABASE, http://www.capstandards.org (last visited Sept. 2, 2015).
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Martinez and Trevino226-and those, too, should be construed as relevant
sources against which to measure IRCP counsel's performance.
State law can provide yet another source of prevailing professional
norms, such as the Louisiana Public Defender Board's Performance
Standards for Criminal Defense Representation in Indigent Capital Cases
("Louisiana Standards"). 227 The Louisiana Standards include numerous
provisions that would encompass post-conviction counsel's obligations
to investigate, present, litigate, and preserve all arguably meritorious
issues, not just substantial ones. 228 The same is true for the Oregon State
Bar's Principles and Standards for Post-Conviction Relief
Practitioners,229 or the Oregon Public Defense Services Commission
230
report, Delivery of Public Defense Services in Death Penalty Cases.
And of course, case law can provide a source of the prevailing
professional norms. 23 1 Relevant to the discussion here, the Supreme
Court in Martinez, in the course of explaining why effective postconviction counsel was necessary, even if as a matter of equity, stated
that "[e]ffective ...counsel preserves claims to be considered on
appeal.., and in federal habeas proceedings. 23 2 Indeed, Chief Judge
226. See Uhrig, supra note 9, at 1280. See generally Ty Alper, Toward a Right to Litigate
Ineffective Assistance of Counsel, 70 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 839 (2013); Freedman, supra note 10;
Lawrence Kornreich & Alexander I. Platt, The Temptation ofMartinez v. Ryan: Legal Ethicsfor the
Habeas Bar, CRIM. L. BRIEF, Fall 2012, at 1;Eve Brensike Primus, Effective Trial Counsel After
Martinez v. Ryan: Focusing on the Adequacy of State Procedures, 122 YALE L.J. 2604 (2013);
Giovanna Shay, The New State Postconviction, 46 AKRON L. REV. 473 (2013); David M. Barron,
Martinez Casts Doubt on State Postconvictionand Federal Habeas Representation, CRIM. JUST.,
Fall 2012, at 42.
227. LA. ADMIN. CODE tit. 22 §§ 1901-1923 (2015).
228. LA. ADMIN. CODE tit. 22 § 1921 (2015).
IN
STATE
&
STANDARDS
FOR
COUNSEL
229. See
generally
PRINCIPLES
POST-CONVICTION RELIEF PROCEEDINGS, ch. 6 (Or. State Bar 2009), available at
http://www.osbar.org/_docs/resources/ConvictionReliefProceedings/CSPCRP3.pdf. The Oregon
Standards apply to all post-conviction counsel, but they are under-inclusive because they explicitly
"do not address many of the special obligations and responsibilities of counsel representing the
petitioner in death penalty cases." Id.at ch. 6, intro.
230. See generally PUB. DEF. SERVS. COMMISS'N, DELIVERY OF PUBLIC DEFENSE SERVICES
IN DEATH PENALTY CASES (2007), available at http://www.oregon.gov/OPDS/docs/ReportI
pdscdeathpenaltyreportandplan.pdf. The Report explicitly embraces and formally adopts the ABA
Guidelines, including those aspects relevant to post-conviction counsel's duties. Id.
231. See, e.g., Porter v. McCollum, 558 U.S. 30, 39-40 (2009) (citing Williams v. Taylor, 529
U.S. 362, 395-96 (2000)) (stating that the prevailing professional norms at the time of trial included
an obligation to thoroughly investigate the defendant's background). The pincite in Williams to
which the Court cited in Porter,in turn, referenced the commentary from the second edition of ABA
Standardsfor CriminalJustice. Porteralso cited Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510, 524-25 (2003), as
a source of professional norms, and the pincites to Wiggins, in turn, cite to the ABA Guidelines and
their contents. The Supreme Court, likewise, confirmed counsel's investigative duties in Rompilla v.
Beard, 545 U.S. 374, 382-83 (2005), and Sears v. Upton, 561 U.S. 945, 946-56 (2010).
232. Martinez v. Ryan, 132 S.Ct. 1309, 1317-18 (citing FED. R. CRIM.P. 52(b) and Edwards v.
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McKee cited Martinez for the proposition that post-conviction
proceedings are the first chance to raise certain constitutional claims,
"and many such claims require significant investigation" by postconviction counsel.233 Accordingly, IRCP counsel "must raise all claims
during state post-conviction proceedings or forfeit review of those
claims in federal court," and IRCP counsel's investigations must be
thorough because "federal review is almost always limited to
the results of the investigations
that occurred during state post234
conviction proceedings.
While the Supreme Court has held that the Sixth Amendment does
not incorporate the ABA Guidelines as inexorable requirements, 235 the
ABA Guidelines and other sources, such as those noted here, are,
nevertheless, guides to what constitutes objectively reasonable
performance by counsel.23 6 And because Martinez declined to decide
whether a Sixth Amendment right to post-conviction counsel exists and,
instead, created an equitable rather than constitutional remedy, whether
the Sixth Amendment incorporates the ABA Guidelines or any other
sources of professional norms is, in practical terms, irrelevant. As such,
the Court can decide questions of post-conviction counsel's performance
without the traditional, rigid Stricklandanalysis.
So, we have established the suitable analysis for assessing IRCP
counsel's performance, and identified some appropriate sources of those
professional norms. But an additional word is necessary to explain why
those courts that applied direct-appeal counsel standards are, in general,
mistaken. First and foremost is the actual context in state court; a state
post-conviction petition is not litigated in the first instance in the
appellate court, but rather in the trial court.237 Thus, the matters at hand
involve investigating and presenting issues, evidence, theories, and
such-all for the first time at the trial court level, not the post-conviction
appeals level. So, on that basis alone, direct appeal professional norms
are an inappropriate measuring stick against which to assess postconviction counsel's performance.
Second, using a direct-appeal-counsel standard of performance-by
which a petitioner must argue that the unraised claim is "clearly
Carpenter, 529 U.S. 446 (2000)).
233. In re Commonwealth's Motion to Appoint Counsel Against or Directed to Defender Ass'n
of Phila., 2015 U.S. App. LEXIS 9878, at *50-52 (3d Cir. June 12, 2015) (McKee, C.J.,
concurring).
234. Id. at *52.
235. Bobby v. Van Hook, 558 U.S. 4, 8 (2009).
236. Id. at 8-9; Wiggins, 539 U.S. at 524.
237. See Alper, supra note 226, at 844 n.20.
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stronger" than those presented, or conversely, that issues counsel raised
were "clearly weaker" than the claim not raised-when there has been
no factual development of the underlying trial-IAC claim, would
effectively mean that, as long as post-conviction counsel raised some
trial-IAC issues, counsel's performance could never be deficient under
Strickland. This is not what the Supreme Court intended in Martinez or
Trevino, as the Ninth Circuit recognized in Dickens.238 Indeed, that
238. Dickens v. Ryan, 740 F.3d 1302, 1320-21 (9th Cir. 2014). The Dickens court rejected the
state's argument that a petitioner cannot overcome a default of a trial-lAC claim via
Martinez/Trevino if the petitioner raised other trial-lAC claims in the IRCP. Id. The court reasoned
that
Martinez contains no language limiting this "equitable exception" simply because a
petitioner brought other IAC claims that were exhausted .... Because courts evaluate
procedural default on a claim-by-claim basis, it follows that Martinez would allow a
petitioner to show cause, irrespective of the presence of other, separate claims.
Id.Applying a comparative-strength test to assess post-conviction counsel's performance also
erroneously perpetuates the outdated notion that winnowing of constitutional claims in state court in
a criminal case should be acceptable under established professional norms. The Supreme Court long
ago stated that winnowing of issues on appeal is important, to focus on "one central issue if
possible, or at most on a few key issues." Jones v. Barnes, 463 U.S. 745, 751-54 (1983). In doing
so, the Court cited statements from Justice Jackson published in 1951, along with other sources
containing guidance for effective appellate advocacy published in 1940, 1976, 1981, and 1982. Id.
at 752-53. In the years since, federal courts have relied upon the Court's statements in Jones, and its
progeny issued three years later, Smith v. Murray, 477 U.S. 527, 536 (1986), to reject innumerable
ineffective-assistance-of-appellate-counsel claims. See, e.g., Wright v. Poole, No. 02-CV-8669
(KMK)(MDF), 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 141210, at *18-19 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 28, 2012).
But, doggedly clinging to the Court's statements about effective appellate advocacy made
decades ago fails to recognize how significantly the criminal justice world-especially the habeas
corpus world-has changed since that time. Especially with the passage of AEDPA in 1996, which
severely limited state prisoners' ability to seek federal habeas review of their constitutional claims
and virtually guaranteed that a prisoner will be made to disappear through myriad procedural trap
doors if he did not raise a claim at every level of state-court proceedings. See Antiterrorism and
Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-132, 110 Stat. 1214 (codified at 28 U.S.C.
§§ 2241-2255). In the current world of the Roberts Court-that is, the world in which the Court is
clear that state prisoners should get only a single bite at the apple, and that it bite should occur in
state court-cases such as Cullen v. Pinholster and Harrington v. Richter expand AEDPA's
restrictions on federal habeas review even further, thereby shackling the typical state prisoner in
federal habeas to the claims and evidence presented in the state courts. See Harrington v. Richter,
562 U.S. 86, 98-100 (2011); Cullen v. Pinholster, 131 S. Ct. 1388, 1398 (2011). In this world,
winnowing of issues by appellate counsel can no longer reasonably be said to constitute objectively
sufficient performance. The consequences from winnowing are now so severe that counsel must
preserve all arguably meritorious claims. After all, yesterday's losing claim that one's client is
categorically ineligible for the death penalty, due to intellectual deficiency or juvenile status at the
time of the offense, is today's life preserver-but only if appellate counsel preserved the claim,
rather than winnowing it out as a clear loser. The same is true for categorical claims such as severe
mental illness or disproportionality, or systemic claims, see, e.g., Glossip v. Gross, 135 S.Ct. 2726,
2755-80 (2015) (Breyer, J., dissenting) (stating belief that it is "highly likely that the death penalty
violates the Eighth Amendment," and that the Court "should call for full briefing on the basic
question"); Jones v. Chappell, 31 F. Supp. 3d 1050, 1053 (C.D. Cal. 2014) (finding death penalty as
administered in California violates the Eighth Amendment), which are well-settled losers today, but
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functional reality is the exact opposite of what the Court intended to do.
Allowing post-conviction counsel's performance to escape review if
counsel raised other claims in post-conviction ignores the Court's

expressed concern for "protect[ing]

prisoners with a potentially

legitimate claim" of trial-IAC.23 9 Using a direct appeal standard also
artificially elevates the requisite standard attributable to the defaulted
claim to something
more than the "some merit" standard emphasized by
40

the Court.

2

Third, IRCP counsel's duties are not strictly limited to "raising and

pursuing claims arising from a criminal trial" like direct appeal counsel,
as one district court erroneously characterized it. 24 1 Rather, claims to be
raised on collateral review are, often by definition, dependent upon
evidence outside the trial record, thus requiring IRCP counsel to

thoroughly investigate-and reinvestigate-a case, much more akin to
trial counsel's professional obligations than direct appeal counsel's
responsibilities to preserve issues that are apparent on the face of the
trial record.242
which may save a life tomorrow.
239. Martinez v. Ryan, 132 S. Ct. 1309, 1315 (2012) (emphasis added).
240. See Folino v. Harlow, No. 11-1582, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 177441, at *34-39 (Dec. 24,
2014). According to the Folino court, failing to raise a trial-JAC claim may "directly establish
deficient performance" by post-conviction counsel if "the omitted issue is so plainly meritorious
that it would have been unreasonable to winnow it out even from an otherwise strong appeal." Id. at
*37-38 (emphasis added) (quoting Cargle v. Mullin, 317 F.3d 1196, 1202 (10th Cir. 2003)).
Conversely, the court concluded, "if the omitted issue has merit but is not so compelling," then the
court would assess "the issue relative to the rest of the appeal, and [give] deferential
consideration.., to any professional judgment involved in its omission." Id. (emphasis added).
241. Sampson v. Palmer, No. 3:ll-cv-00019-LHR-WGC, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 43488, at
*19 (D. Nev. Mar. 31, 2014).
242. For example, the Louisiana Standards include numerous provisions requiring counsel to
investigate various matters that would be inapplicable for direct appeal counsel. See, e.g., LA.
ADMIN. CODE tit. 22 § 1921(A)(9)-(15), (20)-(21), (24)-(31) (2015). For example, the most
pertinent provisions of the Louisiana Standards are those that follow:
9. Post-conviction counsel should interview the client and previous defense team
members about the case, including any relevant matters that do not appear in the record
[and] consider whether any potential off-record matters should have an impact on how
post-conviction review is pursued, and what kind of an investigation of the matter is
warranted.
10. Post-conviction counsel should seek to investigate and litigate all issues, whether or
not previously presented, that are arguably meritorious under the standards applicable to
high quality capital defense representation, including challenges to any overly restrictive
procedural rules and any good faith argument for the extension, modification or reversal
of existing law. Counsel should undertake a high quality, independent, exhaustive
investigation and should not assume that investigation of issues by prior counsel has
been complete or adequate.
11. The investigation and litigation of claims should encompass all arguably available
claims for relief ....
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Fundamentally, the issue is this: post-conviction counsel has
demanding responsibilities, including a duty, as drawn from myriad
sources, to pursue and preserve arguably meritorious claims.243 A
substantial claim would certainly rise above the level of "arguably
meritorious." Hence, failure to investigate, present, litigate, and preserve
a substantial claim is professional incompetence. It is objectively
unreasonable. It is ipso facto deficient performance by post-conviction
counsel for Martinez/Trevino purposes. And, that conclusion is only
reinforced in a capital case, when the stakes are life and death.

12. In conducting the investigation, counsel should have particular regard to the
possibility that claims for relief may arise from matters not previously fully investigated
or litigated ....
13. In investigating the possibility that the client received [IAC], post-conviction counsel
must review both the record in the case and also conduct a thorough investigation of the
facts and circumstances beyond the record in order to determine whether a claim exists
that counsel's performance was deficient....
15. In investigating, preparing and submitting a petition, counsel should seek such prefiling discovery, compulsory process, requests for admissions, depositions and other
orders as are available and appropriate to a high quality, independent, exhaustive
investigation. Counsel should investigate the possibility of and, where appropriate, file
an application for DNA testing pursuant to La. C.Cr.P. art. 926.1.
20. Where counsel raises a claim that has previously been fully litigated in earlier appeal
proceedings in the case, counsel shall fully investigate, prepare and submit an argument
that the claim is nevertheless eligible for consideration in the interests ofjustice.
21. Where counsel raises a claim that was not raised in the proceedings leading to
conviction or sentence, was not pursued on appeal or was not included in a prior postconviction petition, counsel shall fully investigate, prepare and submit a claim that the
failure to previously raise the claim is excusable.
29. Counsel should seek such discovery, compulsory process, requests for admissions,
depositions and other orders as are available and appropriate to the full development and
presentation of all claims in the petition and should document the denial of any such
attempts to secure facts in support of possible claims.
30. Counsel should request an evidentiary hearing for all claims in which the state does
not clearly admit the factual allegations contained in the petition and seek to prove by
admissible evidence those factual allegations that support or establish the client's claims
for relief.
31. Where counsel is considering seeking an evidentiary hearing, counsel should
undertake a full factual investigation of the issue for which the hearing would be sought
so that the decision as to whether to seek a hearing may be made in light of the evidence
that might be adduced at such a hearing. Where counsel does seek an evidentiary
hearing, counsel should ensure that adequate investigation and preparation has been
undertaken to allow counsel to promptly litigate the matter if an evidentiary hearing is
granted.
Id.§ 1921(A)(9)-(13), (15), (20)-(21), (29)-(31).
243. See supra Part IV.
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HOW TO ASSESS PREJUDICE FROM POST-CONVICTION COUNSEL'S
DEFICIENT PERFORMANCE?

Assessing "prejudice" from post-conviction counsel's deficient
performance presents what should be a simple inquiry. Because the
Martinez/Trevino context is not a constitutional question, conventional
notions of Strickland prejudice should be inapplicable; indeed, they are
doctrinal mumbo-jumbo at best and functionally unworkable at worst.
And yet, to date, the federal courts have found this part of the
Martinez!Trevino analysis among the most vexing.
A.

What the Federal Courts Have Done

As with many matters involving Martinez and Trevino, the Ninth
Circuit has done the primary wrestling with this deceptively simple
question. First, in Detrich, the en banc court touched on what must be
shown to satisfy what is now identified as Martinez!Trevino element (2).
The four-judge plurality concluded that "prejudice" from postconviction counsel's failures could be shown by establishing that the
substantial claim will not be heard on the merits.244 In his plurality
opinion, Judge Fletcher first explained that satisfying Martinez!Trevino
element (2) "does not demand a showing of prejudice beyond that
demanded under the first requirement"-that is, that the defaulted claim
is substantial.245 Judge Fletcher then addressed what is necessary to
show in either of the two situations that might result in inadequate IRCP
counsel: no counsel and ineffective counsel.2 46 When there was "no
counsel," there is no need to show prejudice from the pro se inmate
failing to raise a claim "over and above the need to satisfy the first
Martinez requirement that the underlying trial-court IAC claim be
'substantial.' ' 247 Similarly, when there was appointed-but allegedly
ineffective-counsel, a prisoner must show that his counsel "performed
in a deficient manner" and must also satisfy "his required showing that
the trial-counsel IAC claim be 'substantial' under the first Martinez
requirement., 248 Thus, regardless of whether one had no counsel or
deficient appointed counsel, there is no additional requirement to

244.
245.
246.
247.
248.

Detrich v. Ryan, 740 F.3d 1237, 1245-46 (9th Cir. 2013) (plurality opinion).
Id. at 1245.
Id. at 1245-46.
Id.at 1245.
Id.at 1245-46.
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that
establish Martinez!Trevino element (2) "over and above a showing
'249
PCR counsel defaulted a 'substantial' claim of trial-counsel IAC.
The five-judge dissent, authored by Judge Graber, seemed to
disagree with the plurality's notion that prejudice from inadequate IRCP
counsel can be shown by demonstrating Martinez/Trevino element (1).250
Nevertheless, the dissent actually agreed with the substance of Judge
Fletcher's bottom-line conclusion. The dissent recognized that a prisoner
is harmed when post-conviction counsel's failures "might have resulted
in the procedural default [of a constitutional claim] that is, in prejudice"
to the prisoner because no meaningful merits review would then be
afforded to the claim. 1
Judge Nguyen's concurrence "agree[d] with the plurality" that a
prisoner is prejudiced when post-conviction counsel fails to raise a
substantial claim.252 Where Judge Nguyen departed from the plurality
was in their apparent position that prejudice from inadequate IRCP
counsel can be presumed.5 3 But, Judge Nguyen misread the plurality's
standard, and cited instead the dissent's invocation of the "usual
Strickland prejudice showing. 2 54 Accordingly, she concluded, a
petitioner must show "a reasonable probability that the result would have
been different if post-conviction counsel had highlighted trial counsel's
deficient performance.,' 255 But Judge Nguyen's twist on the "usual

Strickland prejudice showing" as the measure of satisfying
MartinezITrevino element (2) is inconsistent with the plurality's
"measure of prejudice" with which Judge Nguyen agreed one page
earlier.25 6 Thus, there were nine-and maybe ten?-votes in Detrich-a
249. Id.at 1246.
250. Id. at 1265 n.3 (Graber, J., dissenting).
251. Id.(emphasis added).
252. Id.at 1260-61 (Nguyen, J., concurring). Judge Nguyen stated:
Post-conviction counsel's ineffective assistance meets the cause prong [of Coleman]
where, among other things, the claim that post-conviction counsel should have raised but
did not-i.e., that trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance-is a substantial one,
which is to say that ...the claim has some merit .... I agree with the plurality that this

is, in a sense, a measure of prejudice, and that it is not a demanding standard.
Id.at 1261.
253. Id. (referring to the plurality's statement that a "prisoner need show only that his PCR
counsel performed in a deficient manner" (quoting id at 1245 (plurality opinion))). Judge Nguyen
also disagreed with the understanding that a petitioner can overcome a procedural default under
Martinez by showing inadequate IRCP counsel and that the underlying claim is substantial. Id
Judge Nguyen noted only that she disagreed with the dissent's reading, but failed to note that the
plurality had also reached the same reading.
254. Id.at 1262.
255. Id.
256. Id. I submit that the root of any apparent disagreement between the plurality and Judge
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majority-for the proposition that precluding any meaningful
opportunity for a meaningful merits review of a substantial
constitutional
claim
was
sufficient
for
fully
satisfying
Martinez!Trevino element (2).257
Then, in holding that § 2254(e)(2) does not prohibit factual
development in federal habeas in the Martinez/Trevino context, the en
banc Ninth Circuit in Dickens explained that demonstrating ineffective
assistance from IRCP "requires a showing that [petitioner's] underlying
trial-counsel JAC claim is substantial. 258 The court did not further
specify, but its holding establishes that showing the underlying claim is
substantial is part of demonstrating either that IRCP counsel performed
deficiently by failing to raise the (substantial) claim, as discussed in Part
IV above, or that showing substantiality suffices to establish any
Strickland prejudice in the MartinezTrevinocontext, or both.259
Also potentially notable is a footnote in Rudin v. Myles, a Ninth
Circuit panel decision involving a question of potential tolling of the
statute-of-limitations deadline. 260 The petitioner presented arguments
seeking statutory tolling under 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2), as well as
arguments seeking equitable tolling. Although the court denied statutory
tolling, footnote thirteen of the majority's opinion included a short

Nguyen in Detrich was simply a matter of substandard drafting by the plurality, and Judge
Nguyen's misunderstanding of what the plurality's standard actually required. The plurality's
introduction of its discussion of Martinez/Trevino element (2) plainly stated the position that
meeting element (2) does require showing something; that is, a showing of that which is "demanded
under" element (1), i.e., that the claim which will never be afforded a meaningful opportunity for
meaningful review is substantial. Id.at 1245 (plurality opinion). Unfortunately, the plurality's
subsequent reiterations of that requirement were less than precise; twice, the plurality began
sentences by appearing to state that no prejudice showing was required in a given IRCP situation.
Id.Hence Judge Nguyen's purported disagreement, as evidenced by her reference to the plurality's
statement that a "prisoner need show only that his PCR counsel performed in a deficient manner,"
without also considering the (qualified) sentence that followed. Id.at 1261 (Nguyen, J., concurring).
A closer examination of the plurality's assertions, such as the one Judge Nguyen quoted, reveals
that both assertions were qualified by a second part of the sentence beginning with "over and
above." Id.at 1245 (plurality opinion). What followed the "over and above" phrase was consistent
language stating that establishing Martinez/Trevino element (1)satisfied the required prejudice
showing under element (2). Id. at 1245-46. And, on that matter, the plurality and the five-judge
dissent functionally agreed, and Judge Nguyen initially agreed. Id.at 1245-46 (plurality opinion);
id at 1261 (Nguyen, J., concurring); id. at 1265 (Graber, J., dissenting).
257. Id.at 1245-46 (plurality opinion); id.at 1261 (Nguyen, J., concurring); id at 1265
(Graber, J., dissenting).
258. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(2); Dickens v. Ryan, 740 F.3d 1302, 1321-22 (9th Cir. 2014) (en
banc).
259. Dickens, 740 F.3d at 1321-22; see supra text accompanying notes 210-12.
260. No. 12-15362, 2015 U.S. App. LEXIS 3823, at *26 n.13 (9th Cir. Mar. 10, 2015).
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discussion of the
potential implications of Martinez on a statutory
2 61

tolling argument.

Notably for our purposes here, the Court explained the "factual
predicate" of Rudin's post-conviction-IAC claim: post-conviction

counsel's deficient performance (based on counsel's abandonment of his
client and failure to file a timely state post-conviction petition), and that
Rudin was "prejudiced by his deficient performance ... when the
Nevada Supreme Court declined to toll the time of [counsel]'s
abandonment and barred Rudin's state petition as untimely. 262
Although this statement was dicta, it articulates a straightforward
understanding that a petitioner is "prejudiced" for purposes of Strickland
analysis when post-conviction counsel's failures resulted in no
meaningful merits review by the state court.263
In the Sixth Circuit, we return again to Leberry for a similar
approach. In that case, the court implicitly found prejudice from postconviction counsel's failures when those failures resulted in the default
of the trial-IAC claims in federal habeas, and, therefore, denial of any
meaningful merits review of those claims.264
261. Id. Footnote thirteen of the majority opinion reads as follows:
In Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 755 ... (1991), the Court noted that a habeas
petitioner may have a constitutional right to the assistance of effective counsel in
collateral proceedings, where state collateral review is the first place a prisoner can
present an ineffective assistance claim. See id; see also Martinez v. Ryan, 132 S. Ct.
1309, 1315 ... (2012) ("Coleman v. Thompson left open.., a question of constitutional
law: whether a prisoner has a right to effective counsel in collateral proceedings which
provide the first occasion to raise a claim of ineffective assistance at trial."). But see
Buenrostro v. United States, 697 F.3d 1137, 1139[-]40 (9th Cir. 2012) ("Martinez did
not decide a new rule of constitutional law."). Rudin does not explicitly articulate a
claim for ineffective assistance of her state [PCR] counsel, but we notice that this claim
nonetheless pervades her claim for equitable tolling. Assuming arguendo that Rudin had
stated such a claim, and that this Court were to recognize the constitutional right left
open by Coleman and acknowledged by Martinez, Rudin may have qualified for
statutory tolling under 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(l)(D).
Id.
262. Id. (emphasis added).
263. But don't just take my word for it: the Office of the Attorney General of California has
explicitly asserted the same argument to the federal court. The State argued that, in Martinez and
Trevino, "the default was a failure to present a claim at all, and the prejudice for the ineffectiveness
finding was the inability of the state court to conduct a merits review." Respondents Brief in
Response to Petitioner's Brief Addressing Exceptions to Procedural Default for First Group of
Defaulted Claims 5, Branner v. Mitchell, No. 3:90-cv-3219-JD (N.D. Cal. Nov. 17, 2014)
(addressing exceptions to procedural default for the first group of defaulted claims). The State then
immediately reiterated this understanding, argued that "Martinez created a narrow exception to
allow for a claim to be reviewed at least one time, thereby fixing' the prejudice resultingfrom the
deficiency of state collateral counsel-i.e., in the absence of counsel's deficient performance, a
petitioner would obtain a merits review of his claims." Id. (emphasis added).
264. Leberry v. Howerton, 583 F. App'x 497, 502 (6th Cir. 2014). The Sixth Circuit ordered
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In the Eighth Circuit, the Sasser II court's orders reveal its
conclusion that determining the substantiality of the underlying trial-IAC
claims was important for determining whether Martinez/Trevino element
(2) could be satisfied in that case; if the claims were substantial, then
denial of any meaningful opportunity for meaningful merits review was
unacceptable under Martinez/Trevino.265
266
Other courts have applied the same reasoning.
There is a line of cases that takes a different, more rigid-and
incorrect-approach, primarily arising from the Ninth Circuit panel
decision in Clabourne v. Ryan.267 The Clabourne court tried to extract
holdings from the fractured Detrich opinion by counting votes for
majority support for a given proposition. 268 According to the court's
counting, a majority of the Detrich panel supported the proposition that a
petitioner must show both Strickland deficient performance and
prejudice from post-conviction counsel in order to overcome a
procedural default under MartinezTrevino.269 The court then wedged
Strickland language into the MartinezITrevino context by concluding
that a petitioner must show "(a) post-conviction counsel's performance
was deficient, and (b) there was a reasonable probability that, absent the
the district court on remand to consider, in the course of determining "actual prejudice" from the
Martinez cause, "whether the particular [IATC] claims defaulted by Leberry are sufficiently
substantial to overcome the default." Id. (emphasis added). The court's qualification of "substantial"
suggests the court found the defaulted IAC claims substantial enough that being denied any
meaningful review of the claims because his post-conviction counsel failed to raise them in state
court prejudiced Leberry enough to meet Martinez's IAC-of-IRCP counsel requirement. Id
265. Sasser 11, 743 F.3d 1151, 1151 (8th Cir. 2014).
266. Dosch v. Dooley, No. 1:14-CV-01016-CBK, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 177456, at *6-9
(D.S.D. Dec. 22, 2014) (explaining that post-conviction counsel's failures would have precluded
any merits review of the underlying claim, before concluding that "[u]nder principles of equity and
law, these practices cannot be excused or condoned," and, thus, the petitioner's default was excused,
and the court would allow further litigation of the claim's merits); Landrum v. Anderson, No. 1:96cv-641, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 138635, at *13-14 (S.D. Ohio Sept. 26, 2013) (concluding that postconviction counsel's deficient performance for failing to raise a claim "was prejudicial because it
prevented consideration of the claim on the merits by the Ohio courts and ultimately in habeas
corpus"), adopted by Landrum v. Anderson, No. 1:96-cv-641, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 72640 (S.D.
Ohio May 28, 2014); Hairston v. Folino, No. 2:12-cv-313, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 159708, at *11
(W.D. Pa. Oct. 15, 2012) (recommending that Rule 59(e) motion be granted following Martinez and
explaining that the "prejudice prong of the [Strickland] test is satisfied by the petitioner's total
involuntary exclusion from the criminal appellate process"); Landrum v. Anderson, No. 1:96 CV
641, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 118501, at *18 (S.D. Ohio Aug. 22, 2012) (finding prejudice from
post-conviction counsel's failures because the default precluded merits review of a substantial claim
by the Sixth Circuit), adopted by Landrum v. Anderson, No. 1:96-cv-641, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
171777 (S.D. Ohio Dec. 4, 2012).
267. 745 F.3d 362, 376-77 (9th Cir. 2014).
268. Id.
269. Id.at 376.
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deficient performance, the27result
of the post-conviction proceedings
0
would have been different.,

But, Clabourne's analysis on this issue is mistaken, and should not
be considered supporting authority for several reasons. 27 1 First, the court
conceded that its approach of cobbling together a majority view by
counting votes from a fractured en banc opinion is not endorsed by the
Supreme Court and is, in fact, the subject of a circuit split. 27 2 Thus, in

those circuits that do not follow the vote-aggregation method of
construing a holding from a circuit court en banc opinion, neither
Clabourne's reasoning, nor its approach, should be considered valid or
authoritative in any way.
Second, the court's vote-counting is flawed. The Clabourne panel
failed to recognize what the Detrich dissent was actually saying in its
assertion, that a petitioner must demonstrate both deficient performance
and prejudice.273 True, the dissent used traditional Strickland language of
"deficient performance" and "prejudice., 274 But the dissent also
recognized that a petitioner is prejudiced by post-conviction counsel's
failures which result in a procedural default of a claim, thereby denying
the prisoner a meaningful opportunity for a meaningful merits review.275
In other words, the Detrich dissent said yes, a petitioner must still show
"prejudice" from post-conviction counsel's deficient performance
because that is what the Strickland paradigm requires. But then the
Detrich dissent proffered a substantive explanation of what satisfies that

270. Id. at 377. Some district courts have cited this language in Clabourne to likewise require
that a prisoner must show a reasonable probability of a different result in post-conviction
proceedings but for post-conviction counsel's deficient performance in order to excuse a default.
See, e.g., Runningeagle v. Ryan, No. CV-98-1903-PHX-PGR, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 140289, at
*25-26 (D. Ariz. Oct. 2, 2014). Those district courts that have followed Clabourne are, with only
two exceptions, confined to district courts in Tennessee and within the Ninth Circuit. See, e.g., id.;
Duncan v. Carpenter, No. 3:88-00992, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 110595, at *48-49 (M.D. Tenn. Aug.
11, 2014). Other courts have also articulated the same reading of Martinez/Trevino element (2)
without citing Clabourne, but those courts are mistaken for the same reasons identified here. See,
e.g., Bland v. Pash, No. 15-0041-CV-W-GAF-P, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 72234, at *6-9 (W.D. Mo.
June 4, 2015).
271. Clabourne also erred by at least purporting to use the traditional Coleman "cause and
prejudice" analysis for overcoming a procedural default in the MartinezITrevino context. See
Clabourne, 745 F.3d at 375. That error is somewhat mitigated by the fact that the court functionally
just adopted the "substantiality" inquiry-MartinezITrevino element (l)-as the measure of
Coleman prejudice, while applying MartinezTrevino element (2)-showing IAC of post-conviction
counsel-as Coleman "cause." See supra notes 68-69 and accompanying text.
272. Clabourne, 745 F.3d at 376 n.3.
273. Detrich v. Ryan, 740 F.3d 1237, 1265 (9th Cir. 2013) (Graber, J., dissenting).
274. Id.
275. See id. at 1268.
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"prejudice" requirement that comports with what the plurality-without
explicitly using the label of "prejudice"-would have required.276
Moreover, the Detrich dissent's primary point of contention was
not what a petitioner needed to show to satisfy Martinez/Trevino element
(2), but rather those judges' conclusion that, on the record in that case,
the petitioner could not establish that his defaulted claims were
substantial, and, thus, there was no need for further judicial review of the
case. 2 77 Judge Nguyen's concurrence actually addresses the matter more
substantively. But, her concurring opinion is internally contradictory,
and predicated on a misreading of what the Detrich plurality was
.278
substantively requiring to establish Martinez/Trevino element (2)
So, the Clabourne court's requirement for demonstrating prejudice
is not actually supported by a cobbled-together majority in Detrich, and,
in fact, contravenes such a majority. The difference between the
standards contemplated by the plurality, the dissent, and Judge Nguyen's
concurrence is more a matter of labels; they seemingly agreed on the
matter of substance. But, Clabourne failed to recognize the substantive
agreement, noted the labeling difference, and then grafted its own
substantive interpretation into the analysis.
Put differently still, a majority of judges (Judge Graber with the
plurality and Judge Nguyen) in Detrich said that Strickland requires
prejudice from post-conviction counsel's failures, while the plurality
implicitly said the same. And, a different majority of judges (those
joining Judge Fletcher and those joining Judge Graber)-initially joined
by Judge Nguyen-added that prejudice in this context means default of
a claim thereby denying a prisoner any meaningful opportunity for
meaningful merits review.279 But the Clabourne court missed the mark
by erroneously concluding that the majority of judges in Detrich were
saying: "Strickland requires prejudice from post-conviction counsel's
failures, and 'prejudice' in this context means a reasonable probability
of a different outcome in post-conviction proceedings. 2 8 °
Third, the court's articulation of the "usual Strickland standard" as
applicable in the MartineziTrevino context is unfaithful to both
Strickland itself and to Martinez. Strickland asks whether there is a
reasonable probability of a different outcome but for counsel's
276.
277.
278.
279.
(Graber,
280.

See id.
Id.
See supra note 256 and accompanying text.
Id. at 1245-46 (plurality opinion); id. at 1261 (Nguyen, J., concurring); id at 1265
J., dissenting).
See Clabourne v. Ryan, 745 F.3d 362, 377 (9th Cir. 2014).
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failures,28 1 with the "ultimate focus of inquiry" being the "fundamental
fairness" of the proceeding in question and whether the result of the
particular proceeding is unreliable due to a breakdown in the adversarial
process when counsel performs deficiently. 82 So, when the claim in
question is a trial-IAC claim, prejudice exists when there is a reasonable
probability of a different result but for trial counsel's failures, or when
confidence in the reliability of the verdict is undermined due to
counsel's failures.283
Thus, in the context of overcoming a default of a trial-IAC claim
via Martinez/Trevino, the relevant question under Clabourne's approach
would become whether there is a reasonable probability of a reasonable
probability of a different outcome at trial but for post-conviction
counsel's deficient performance. Those double-headed reasonable
probabilities are nonsense. Moreover, they either: (1) dilute what a
petitioner would need to show, or (2) impermissibly enhance what a
petitioner would need to show.
On one hand, if a "reasonable probability" for IAC is some
quantum less than "more likely than not,, 284 or the "preponderance of
the evidence, 285 then a "reasonable probability of a reasonable
probability" must be a still-lower standard, not a requirement of showing
that the post-conviction court would have granted post-conviction relief,
as the Clabourne court concluded, or a requirement of showing that the
outcome of trial would have been different but for trial counsel's
deficient performance. 286 Furthermore, the Clabourne standard removes
entirely what the Supreme Court identified as the "ultimate inquiry" in
an IAC claim, namely the fundamental fairness of the proceeding and
whether the outcome is unreliable due to the breakdowns in the
adversary process caused by counsel's failures.287

281. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 694-95 (1984).
282. Id. at 696; see also, e.g., Jackson v. Bradshaw, 681 F.3d 753, 760 (6th Cir. 2012)
(explaining that "[a] defendant is not accorded his Sixth Amendment right to counsel if 'counsel's
conduct so undermined the proper functioning of the adversarial process that the trial cannot be
relied on as having produced a just result' (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 686)).
283. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 686. This is also consistent with the prejudice standard articulated
in Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963), from which the Court cribbed in its Strickland ruling.
Prejudice from a Brady violation is demonstrated by showing that the disclosure of the exculpatory
evidence would have undermined confidence in the verdict. See, e.g., Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S.
419, 434-35 (1995); Gumm v. Mitchell, 775 F.3d 345, 363 (6th Cir. 2014).
284. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 693-94 (rejecting the "more likely than not" standard of
prejudice); see Porter v. McCollum, 558 U.S. 30, 44 (2009).
285. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694 (rejecting the "preponderance of the evidence" standard).
286. See id.
287. See id. at 686.
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On the other hand, if the Clabourne standard is construed as being
an outcome-determinative showing, by which a prisoner must show that
his underlying trial-IAC claim is a meritorious or even a winningrather than just "substantial"-claim in order to show prejudice from
post-conviction counsel's deficient performance, then that, too,
contravenes the Supreme Court's rule. It demands more than what
Martinez/Trevino require at the preliminary inquiry stage.288
Finally, Clabourne should not be relied upon as authority for the
simple reason that it contradicts earlier-issued published opinions in
Detrich and Dickens.289
B. So Now What?
Answering the question of how to assess prejudice from postconviction counsel's deficient performance should start with reframing
the question. Instead, ask and then identify what the court intended to
accomplish by Martinez and Trevino-to create an avenue by which a
prisoner could overcome a procedural default of a claimed violation of a
bedrock, constitutional right, thereby ensuring a meaningful opportunity
to obtain a meaningful merits review of that constitutional claim. That
understanding leads inexorably to the following conclusion: ineffective
assistance of IRCP counsel can be demonstrated-and MartinezITrevino
element (2) thereby established-if counsel failed to properly and fully
raise a claim that was substantial, depriving the prisoner of any
meaningful chance to litigate the claim and any meaningful merits
review of the claim.
That conclusion, in turn, is supported by the text of Martinez itself.
The Court explained the responsive options a state has when a petitioner
asserts that his default can be excused based on IAC of IRCP counsel.290
The State can argue that "the [IATC] claim is insubstantial, i.e., it does
not have any merit or that it is wholly without factual support, or that the
attorney in the initial-review collateral proceeding did not perform
below constitutional standards., 291 In Martinez, "[n]owhere does the

288. For further explanation of why the Clabourne court's approach creates an "impractical
application of Martinez," see Robin C. Konrad, Post-Conviction and Prejudice: The Ninth Circuit's
Application ofMartinez in Pending CapitalCases, 7 P-tx. L. REv. 289, 308 n.102 (2013).
289. See, e.g., United States v. Sinisterra, 237 F. App'x 467, 471 (11 th Cir. 2007) (stating that
the court "adopted the rule that a prior decision of the circuit (panel or en banc) cannot be overruled
by a later panel but only by the court sitting en banc or by the United States Supreme Court"
(emphasis added)).
290. Martinez v. Ryan, 132 S. Ct. 1309, 1319 (2012).
291. Id. (emphasis added).
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Court mention that a state could answer by arguing that post-conviction
counsel's substandard performance did not prejudice petitioner" in postconviction proceedings.292 This can be taken as evidence that the Court
viewed prejudice from post-conviction counsel's deficient performance
to be self-evident-the prisoner was prejudiced by virtue of being denied
a meaningful opportunity for a meaningful merits review of his
substantial constitutional claim.
Trevino likewise supports the same, by explaining that the
MartinezITrevino exception is necessary because, where it applies, "a
lawyer's failure to raise [a trial-IAC] claim during initial-review
collateral proceedings, could. .. deprive a defendant of any review of
that claim at all. 293 The Court further reiterated the same understanding,
explaining that a prisoner will be denied any opportunity at all for
review of a constitutional claim if the claim is one that was required to
be litigated in IRCP, but was not due to counsel's failures.294
Furthermore, although the "traditional" Stricklandprejudice inquiry
should be inapplicable in the Martinez/Trevino context, the result is the
same even if we invoke the language of the traditional Strickland
prejudice inquiry. Post-conviction counsel's failure to raise the
substantial claim is analogous to the "deficient performance" element
under the traditional Strickland analysis. 95 And, the deprivation
of any meaningful opportunity for investigation and factual
development, leading to deprivation of any chance for a meaningful
claim, is analogous to the "prejudice"
merits review of the substantial
296
element under Strickland.
Support for this conclusion is drawn directly from Martinez and
Trevino, as well as the language of Strickland. As the Supreme Court
explained, habeas courts determining the question of prejudice from
deficient performance by counsel "should be concerned with
292. Konrad, supra note 288, at 321.
293. Trevino v. Thaler, 133 S.Ct. 1911, 1918 (2013).
294. Id. at 1921. Interestingly, the Court used quotation marks around the word
"ineffectiveness" when referencing "a lawyer's 'ineffectiveness' during an [IRCP]," which is
further evidence that the Court recognized that a Strickland ineffectiveness inquiry is different in the
Martinez/Trevino context. See id.
295. See supra Part IV.
296. See supra Part IV. We also see shades of this line of reasoning in the recent order granting
habeas relief in Barnett. Memorandum and Order at 167, Barnett v. Roper, 941 F. Supp. 2d 1099
(E.D. Mo. Aug. 18, 2015) (No. 4:03-cv-00614-ERW) (explaining that "[c]onsidering the substantial
and compelling nature of Mr. Barnett's underlying claim.., the Court believes Mr. Barnett would
have received relief from the [state post-conviction court] under his [trial-IAC claim], had he
received an evidentiary hearing," and then explaining why Barnett would have likely received an
evidentiary hearing but for IRCP counsel's failures).
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whether ... the result of the particular proceeding is unreliable because
of a breakdown in the adversarial process that our system counts on to
produce just results. 29 7 And, that concern for protecting the "foundation
for our adversary system" from breakdowns that occur due to postconviction counsel's failures was the first of three reasons that drove the
Court's holding first in Martinez, and then in Trevino.298 Trevino made
clear that the absence of any meaningful investigative opportunity and
any meaningful merits review of a substantial claim subverts protection
of "a bedrock principle in our justice system., 299 And, when the
"critically important" right to effective counsel that lies at "the
foundation of our adversary system" has been subverted,30 0 confidence
in the reliability of the verdict is undermined, thereby establishing the
fundamental definition of Strickland prejudice.30 ' Indeed, the Court
found such subversion sufficiently harmful-prejudicial-to a prisoner
to carve out an equitable exception to the normal procedural default
rules that were well-settled for decades.30 2
Finally, the logic articulated in Judge Fletcher's Detrich plurality
distills the answer nicely. Allowing satisfaction of Martinez/Trevino
element (2) by showing that post-conviction counsel failed to raise a
substantial claim that is, consequently, never to be investigated or
reviewed meaningfully, "is necessary to harmonize the second Martinez
requirement with the rest of the Martinez framework. 30 3 If a petitioner
would be required to show that he has a reasonable probability of a
different outcome in post-conviction proceedings "in order to satisfy the
second Martinez requirement," however, "the prisoner would have to
show, as a condition for excusing his procedural default of a claim, that
he would succeed on the merits of that same claim. 30 4 "But if a prisoner
were required to show that the defaulted trial-counsel IAC claims"
would fully prevail on the merits "in order to satisfy the second Martinez
requirement, this would render superfluous the first Martinez

297.
U.S. 362,
298.
(2012)).
299.
300.
301.
302.
303.
304.

Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 696 (1984); see also Williams v. Taylor, 529
390-91 (2000).
See Trevino, 133 S. Ct. at 1917, 1921 (citing Martinez v. Ryan, 132 S. Ct. 1309, 1317
Id. at 1917; Martinez, 132 S. Ct. at 1317.
Trevino, 133 S. Ct. at 1917, 1921; Martinez, 132 S. Ct. at 1317.
Strickland, 466 U.S. at 696.
See id.
Detrich v. Ryan, 740 F.3d 1237, 1246 (9th Cir. 2013).
Id.
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requirement of showing that the underlying [constitutional]
claims were
' 30 5
'substantial'-that is, that they merely had 'some merit."'
VI.

CONCLUSION

The Court's decisions in Martinez and Trevino have the potential to
be among the most significant entries to the Court's habeas
jurisprudence since Strickland itself.30 6 That which was barred for
decades is now available to prisoners, giving significance to postconviction proceedings, a part of the criminal justice system that has
long been neglected or given short shrift by the States.30 7 That the Court
has now recognized that equity demands a prisoner be given a
meaningful opportunity for factual development of a substantial claim,
followed by at least one chance for a meaningful merits review of that
substantial claim is, itself, significant.30 8 That the Court based that
equitable development on concerns for protecting bedrock constitutional
rights is even more significant. 30 9 Nevertheless, how the federal courts
interpret and apply the thorny substantive questions Martinez and
Trevino identified, and discussed in this article and others, will
ultimately be the true measure of how serious we, the people, are about
genuinely protecting those fundamental constitutional rights.

305. Id.
306. See Justin F. Marceau, Is Guilt Dispositive? Federal Habeas After Martinez, 55 WM. &
MARY L. REv. 2071, 2131-32 (2014).
307. See id.
308. Seesupra Part V.
309. See supraPart V.
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